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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to critically analyse the thesis of Hans-Herman Hoppe 
that	although	any	government	–	taken	as	a	territorial	monopolist	in	the	field	of	ju-
risdiction and tax imposition – is an organisation harmful both from the economic 
and	ethical	point	of	view	since	it	violates	property	rights	in	an	institutionalised	and	
legal	manner,	exploiting	private	owners	and	contributing	to	the	process	of	“decivili-
zation,” yet the monarchy is less harmful than any democratic state.
The	ultimate	point	is	to	prove	that	Hoppe’s	assumption	on	lower	time	preference	
of	the	governing	monarch	is	not	sufficient	to	conclude	that	monarchy	is	less	respon-
sible for violating property rights and that it contributes to the process of “decvilizia-
tion” less than democracy.
Keywords: Hans Herman Hoppe, democracy-monarchy comparison, economic 
freedom.
Resumen
El propósito de este trabajo es analizar críticamente la tesis de Hans-Herman 
Hoppe según  la cual, si bien cualquier forma de gobierno –tomado como un mo-
nopolista	 territorial	 en	 el	 terreno	 de	 la	 jurisdicción	 y	 de	 la	 imposición	 fiscal–	 es	
una organización lesiva tanto desde el punto de vista económico como ético, puesto 
que viola los derechos de propiedad de manera institucionalizada y legal, explotan-
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do a los propietarios privados y contribuyendo al proceso de “descivilización”, la 
monarquía resultaría menos dañina que cualquier estado democrático. 
El objetivo último es probar que el postulado de Hoppe de que es preferible el 
gobierno	de	un	monarca	no	es	suficiente	para	concluir	que	la	monarquía	es	menos	
responsable de la violación de los derechos de propiedad, ni tampoco que contribuye 
menos activamente que la democracia al proceso de “descivilización”.
Palabras clave: Hans Herman Hoppe, comparativa monarquía-democracia, lib-
ertad económica
1. Hoppe on monarchy and democracy
In	his	works,	Hans-Hermann	Hoppe	presents	the	thesis	that	any	government	–	re-
garded	as	a	territorial	monopolist	in	the	field	of	jurisdiction	and	tax	imposition	–	is	an	
organisation	harmful	both	from	economic	and	ethical	point	of	view,	since	it	violates	
property	rights	in	an	institutionalized	and	legal	manner,	exploiting	private	owners	
and	contributing	to	the	process	of	“decivilization.”	However,	he	continues	to	argue	
that monarchy is less harmful than democracy.1
The	fundamental	argument	used	by	Hoppe	to	prove	his	thesis	is	that	of	the	lower	
time	 preference	 of	monarchs	 (who	 usually	 rule	 for	 a	 lifetime,	 often	 hereditarily)	
than	 people	 in	 power	 in	 democratic	 states	 (chosen	 for	 a	fixed	 period	 of	 time).	A	
monarch,	who	could	potentially	rule	for	a	lifetime	and	with	a	prospect	of	passing	the	
function	down	to	his	relative	will	undertake	actions	only	after	considering	their	long-
term	consequences	in	order	to	guarantee	the	long-term	benefits,	which,	according	to	
Hoppe,	could	be	identified	with	the	care	for	maintaining	and	increasing	the	wealth	
of	the	people	living	on	the	territory	over	which	he	rules:
[…]	 the	more	productive	 the	population,	 the	higher	will	 be	 the	value	of	 the	 rul-
er’s	parasitic	monopoly	of	 expropriation.	He	will	use	his	monopolistic	privilege,	
of	course	[...].	But	as	the	government’s	private	owner,	it	is	in	his	interest	to	draw	
parasitically	on	a	growing,	increasingly	productive	and	prosperous	nongovernment	
economy	as	this	would	effortlessly	also	increase	his	own	wealth	and	prosperity.2
As	a	consequence,	he	will	exploit	his	subjects	less,	borrow	money	more	reason-
ably,	he	will	be	 less	willing	to	spend	money	on	wars	and	will	care	for	respecting	
property	rights	(since	their	elimination	constitutes	a	threat	to	his	own	wealth).	On	
the	contrary,	heads	of	democratic	states,	who	are	not	the	owners	of	the	government,	
1 H.-H. Hoppe, Democracy: The God That Failed,	 New	 Brunswick:	 New	 Jersey,	 Transaction	
Publishers,	2001,	pp.	xix-xi;	11-15;	39-40.
2 Ibidem, p. 47.
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but	only	temporary	clerks,	will	pursuit	only	the	increase	of	the	present	income	and	
wealth.	This	 implies	 that	 they	will	be	more	willing	 to	expropriate,	 increase	 taxes	
(both	 directly	 and	 indirectly,	 through	 inflation)	 and	 borrow	money	 irresponsibly	
since	they	are	aware	that	paying	these	debts	will	be	the	problem	of	their	successors	
and	not	 their	own.	 In	order	 to	assume	and	hold	power,	 they	will	promise	various	
privileges to different groups and carry out the policy of redistribution at a great 
scale – through taxation or regulations imposed on private property and the mar-
ket.	They	will	also	be	more	willing	to	engage	in	wars,	which,	owing	to	the	greater	
identification	of	the	society	with	the	state	that	results	from	“blurring”	of	the	border	
between	the	rulers	and	their	subjects,	will	be	more	violent.3
As	the	empirical	data	that	prove	his	thesis,	Hoppe	presents	examples	that	show	the	
greater increase in the extortion by the state – higher tax rates and larger debt, more 
regulations,	 higher	 inflation,	 higher	 employment	 in	 the	 state	 institutions,	 and	 the	
evolution	of	wars	into	total	wars	–	during	the	“democratic	republican	age”	(Hoppe	
acknowledges	the	end	of	the	I	World	War	as	the	beginning	of	this	era)	than	during	
the prior, “monarchy age.”4
However,	should	we	assume	that	data	referred	to	by	Hoppe	prove	that	there	is	in	
fact	a	causal	relationship	between	democracy	and	the	increase	in	the	extortion	by	the	
state? It needs to be noted that Hoppe’s approach is an ahistoric one: he contrasts 
societies	that	lived	in	two	different	historic	periods,	neglecting	the	possibility	that	
other	factors	(such	as	e.g.	the	level	of	material	development)	could	influence	the	ex-
tortion	by	the	state	as	well,	and	that	the	causal	relationship	has	an	opposite	direction	
– i.e. the change of the form of the state from monarchy to democracy is a result, 
not	a	cause	of	the	increase	in	the	extortion	by	the	state	(influenced	by	other	factors).	
Were	Hoppe’s	thesis	to	be	true,	it	should	be	proven	by	conclusions	drawn	from	the	
comparison of democratic and non-democratic states existing during the same period 
of	history,	the	states	of	societies	that	were	culturally	similar	and	similarly	developed.	
However,	Hoppe	failed	to	present	such	comparison,	probably	because	he	trusts	his	
theoretical analysis completely and because in his approach, “a priori theory” is su-
perior to the empirical data.5
This paper aims at providing such comparison. Although Hoppe is right claiming 
that the dominance of democratic states started only after the I World War, it is true 
that democratic states, or at least those including elements of democracy, existed 
throughout history.
3 Ibidem,	pp.	25-27;	30-31;	33-39;	47-48;	84;	86.
4 Ibidem,	pp.	41;	54-58;	59;	62;	69.
5 Ibidem, p. xvi.
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2. Icelandic Free State vs. Norwegian monarchy during 10th – 13th centuries
The	first	 example	 to	 be	 discussed	 is	 the	 so-called	 Icelandic	Free	State,	which	
existed in 930-1262 (in practice, until the end of the 12th	century,	when	the	system	
started to collapse). Today, it might be referred to as a kind of federal republic in-
cluding elements of direct democracy and aristocracy (represented by chieftains – 
goðar).	The	official	institutional	structure	of	the	Icelandic	Free	State	comprised	of	
thirteen regional assemblies (héraðsþing) and one national assembly (Alþing – this 
name	most	probably	comes	from	the	word	almannaþing,	meaning	“the	þing	of	all	
men”).	Regional	assemblies	were	convened	twice	a	year	and	were	gatherings	of	sup-
porters of all goðar in a particular district. Alþing, being the gathering of all goðar 
(each goði	was	allowed	to	bring	one-ninth	of	his	supporters	–	the	support	for	each	
chieftain	was	not	a	constant	feudal	relation,	but	a	free	choice	from	a	certain	group	
of	people	that	could	be	changed	at	any	time),	was	convened	once	a	year,	in	summer.	
It	was	centred	around	the	legislative	council	of	the	assembly	(Lögrétta), comprising 
all goðar,	which	was	responsible	for	ratifying	common	laws	and	issuing	individual	
permissions	to	act	against	the	law,	e.g.	marriage	between	close	relatives	or	refusal	
to	execute	the	sentencing	of	the	court.	In	order	to	become	binding,	laws	ratified	by	
Lögrétta required unanimity and needed to be proclaimed during three consecutive 
Alþing conventions. Decisions regarding abovementioned individual permissions re-
quired unanimity and lack of objection of any of the participants of the convention 
(including	those	who	were	not	Lögrétta members),	as	well	as	a	proper	fee.	Both	local	
and national assemblies had courts founded on the jurors appointed by goðar. These 
courts	only	decided	on	the	guilt	or	lack	thereof	–	the	punishment	was	determined	by	
the	law	itself	(rejection	or	mitigation	could	only	be	possible	with	the	permission	of	
the Lögrétta).6
Icelandic	Free	State	was	one	of	the	least	statist	societies	in	human	history,	hence,	
it is commonly referred to by libertarians as an example of a functional system of 
polycentric	security	and	justice.	It	appointed	only	one	civil	servant	(a	lawspeaker	–	
Lögsögumaðr),	whose	responsibility	was	to	conduct	the	national	assembly	and	its	
legislative	council,	answering	inquiries	concerning	the	law	and	publicly	reciting	the	
Icelandic	law.	The	execution	of	court	rulings	was	the	responsibility	of	victims	them-
selves,	their	chieftains	or	other	third	parties	that	victims	passed	this	right	down	to.7
During	a	hundred	years	(until	1097)	the	Free	State	was	free	of	compulsory	tax-
ation nor did chieftains impose any taxes on their supporters that they collaborated 
with.	However,	in	1097,	Lögrétta ratified	a	law	introducing	tíund (tithe) – an annual 
6 W.	 Gogłoza,	 “Upadek	 policentrycznego	 porządku	 konstytucyjnego	 średniowiecznej	 Islandii	 w	
świetle	 teorii	 stanu	 natury	 Roberta	Nozicka”,	 in	Oblicza wolności. Od klasycznego liberalizmu do 
libertarianizmu, Katowice,	Wydawnictwo	Uniwersytetu	Śląskiego,	2013,	pp.	55-58.
7 Ibidem, pp. 57-59.
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tax	of	1	per	cent	of	the	worth	of	the	debt-free	movable	and	immovable	property	that	
was	used	to	pay	for	the	help	provided	to	those	eligible	to	benefits	and	to	maintain	
churches	and	the	clergy.	There	were	no	other	taxes.	As	regards	wars,	Iceland	was	
not	involved	in	any	external	conflicts	during	this	period.	Internal	conflicts	were	rare	
(during	1030-1120	people	even	stopped	carrying	weapons)	until	the	collapse	of	the	
system in the 13th	 century,	when	during	1208-1260	 the	death	poll	of	 local	battles	
amounted to 350 people (7 per year), constituting about 0,7 per cent of the country’s 
populace.8
In	contrast,	Norway,	a	monarchy	at	that	time,	had	much	more	taxes.	As	reported	
in Íslendingabók, Harald	Fairhair	imposed	a	fee	of	five aurar (ounces of silver) on 
every	 traveller	who	wished	 to	 visit	 Iceland,	which	 constitutes	 the	origin	of	 a	 fee	
called landaurar, set on 0,5 mark (one mark = 4 ounces) by king Olaf II.9 On top 
of	that,	Norwegians	also	paid	tithe	to	the	church	and	were	obliged	to	serve	in	the	na-
tional	fleet (leiðangr).	Moreover,	they	were	expected	to	contribute	natural	resources	
to	 the	king	when	he	was	 travelling	across	 the	country	 (veizla). These obligations 
evolved into taxes.10 Conquered peoples, such as Sámi, inhabitants of the Faroe 
Islands,	Orkney	Islands,	Hebrides	and	the	Isle	of	Man,	were	obliged	to	pay	a	tribute	
to	the	king	of	Norway	(skattr).11
The	kingdom	of	Norway	also	had	much	more	complex	administration.	According	
to the article on this issue in Medieval Scandinavia: An Encyclopedia, there	were	a	
number	of	local	offices	(armaðr, gjaldkeri, syslumaðr, lögmaðr) existing since the 
12th century.12	In	contrast	to	quite	calm	Iceland,	Norway	engaged	in	many	conflicts,	
both internal and external. Successors of Harald Fairhair – Eric Bloodaxe, Haakon I 
of	Norway,	Harald	Greycloak,	Haakon	Sigurdsson,	Olaf	Tryggvason,	Olaf	II,	Harald	
Hardrada	–	were	constantly	at	war,	both	with	internal	enemies,	as	well	as	other	coun-
tries.	They	got	into	power	through	the	use	of	force	and	violence	and	lost	it	the	same	
way.	The	year	1130	was	the	beginning	of	the	fights	for	the	throne	that	lasted	over	a	
hundred years (until 1240).13
The Icelandic Free State is sometimes denied the right to be called a state at all 
–	it	is	referred	to	as	an	example	of	anarchy,	since	the	issue	of	ensuring	security	was	
8  Ibidem, pp. 57-60, 67-68.
9 Íslendingabók, retrieved 27	May	2016	from:	http://en.wikisource.org/
wiki/%C3%8Dslendingab%C3%B3k.
10 S. Imsen (ed.), „Taxes, tributes and tributary lands in the makingof the Scandinavian kingdoms 
in the Middle Ages”, in: Norgesveldet, Chapter 1: From tributes to taxes, Occasional Papers No. 2, 
Trondheim, Fagbokforlaget, 2001, p 15.
11 Ibidem,	p.	14;	R.	B.	Wærdahl,	The Incorporation and Integration of the King’s Tributary Lands into 
the Norwegian Realm c. 1195-1397, Leiden-Boston, Brill, 2011, p. 31, 62, 106.
12 K. Helle, Royal Administration and Finances – 2. Norway, in P. Pulsiano and K. Wolf (eds), Medieval 
Scandinavia: An Encyclopedia, Garland,  Routletge, 1993, p. 540.
13 S. Bagge, From Viking Stronghold to Christian Kingdom: State Formation in Norway, c. 900-1350, 
Museum Tusculanum Press, 2010, pp. 25-32, 40.
Jacek Sierpiński A Critique of Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s Thesis...
Res Publica. Revista de Historia de las Ideas Políticas    
Vol. 19 Núm. 2 (2016): 521-559
526
offered by competitive institutions (in this case – goðar).14	As	noted	by	Gogłoza	in	
one	of	the	footnotes	in	his	work:
Medieval	Icelanders	[...]	knew	that	this	system	was	not	a	state,	nor	was	it	anything	
“similar to it.” While in reference to continental monarchies they used terms – ríki 
(“kingdom,”	e.g.	Norgesríki	–	the	kingdom	of	Norwegians)	or	–veldi	(“state,”	e.g.	
Danaveldi	–	 the	kingdom	of	Danes),	 they	never	 referred	 to	 their	own	country	as	
“Íslandsríki” or “Íslendingaveldi.”15
Therefore, one might argue that the Icelandic Free State is not an example of the 
state	as	defined	by	Hoppe.	However,	from	the	point	of	view	of	Hoppe’s	understanding	
of the term – an agency in possession of a compulsory territorial monopoly on juris-
diction	and	taxation	–	the	Free	State	as	a	whole	was	in	fact	a	state.	It	had	institutions	
responsible	for	ratifying	laws	applicable	to	everyone,	including	chieftains,	and	those	
responsible	 for	making	decisions	on	 individual	exceptions	 from	the	 law,	as	well	as	
proclaiming	final	court	decisions	that	needed	to	be	respected	by	everyone.	Introducing	
tíund	proved	that	the	Free	State	had	right	to	impose	taxes	as	well.	Hence,	while	chief-
tains could be treated as competing agents offering the service of ensuring property 
rights,	the	Free	State	as	a	whole	had	an	actual	(and	compulsory,	even	though	the	com-
pulsion	was	“bottom-up”	in	nature)	monopoly	on	jurisdiction	and	taxation.
It	is	true	that	the	system	of	the	Free	State	was	not	an	absolute	democracy,	since	
important	decisions,	such	as	ratifying	laws	and	appointing	judges,	were	the	responsi-
bility of goðar, who	were	not	chosen	democratically	in	the	present-day	sense	of	this	
term	–	they	were	a	kind	of	aristocracy	(however,	they	were	not	a	closed	cast	either	
since	one	could	pay	one’s	way	into	the	group).16 On the other hand,
In order to play an important role (both locally and nationally), chieftains needed 
the support of a great number of associated supporters. Without their collaboration, 
chieftain	would	not	be	able	to	appoint	courts	of	the	common	assemblies,	nor	could	
he	execute	court	rulings.	However,	bearing	in	mind	that	bændr	were	free	to	choose	
their	 chieftain	 [...],goðar	 had	 to	 seek	 their	 support	 by	 holding	 sumptuous	 feasts,	
giving	generous	 gifts,	 entering	 into	 new	and	 cementing	 already	 existing	 (family,	
friendly, contractual) alliances and, obviously, effectively representing associated 
bændr	in	disputes.17
14 Þ. Eggertsson, Economic Behavior and Institutions, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, 
pp. 308-309.
15 W.	 Gogłoza,	 „Upadek	 policentrycznego	 porządku	 konstytucyjnego	 średniowiecznej	 Islandii	 w	
świetle	 teorii	 stanu	 natury	 Roberta	Nozicka”,	 in	Oblicza wolności. Od klasycznego liberalizmu do 
libertarianizmu, Katowice,	Wydawnictwo	Uniwersytetu	Śląskiego,	2013,	p.	56.
16 Ibidem, p. 55.
17 Ibidem, p. 65.
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In	reality,	chieftains,	at	 least	during	the	first	200	years,	were	dependent	on	the	
support	of	the	people	that	chose	to	associate	with	them.
On	the	other	hand,	this	system	was	certainly	not	a	monarchy.	Hoppe	emphasizes	
that: „monarchy and democracy can be conceived of analytically as representing the 
two	endpoints	of	a	continuum,	with	various	possible	forms	of	government	located	at	
greater or lesser distances from one or the other extreme.”18	From	this	point	of	view,	
the	Icelandic	Free	State	was	more	of	a	democracy	and	less	of	a	monarchy	that	con-
temporary	monarchies,	e.g.	Norwegian	monarchy.	Nevertheless,	 it	was	much	 less	
statist	(fewer	taxes	and	civil	servants)	and	less	violent	(fewer	wars)	–	and	this	fact	
constitutes a contradiction of Hoppe’s thesis.
3. The Commonwealth vs. European monarchies during the 18th century
Another	example	worth	analyzing	and	comparing	with	contemporary	European	
monarchies	 is	 the	Commonwealth	 (Kingdom	of	 Poland	 and	 the	Grand	Duchy	 of	
Lithuania) of 1569-1795. It is particularly interesting to consider the 18th century 
since the character of the monarchies of that time corresponds to Hoppe’s use of the 
term most accurately.19	Even	though	the	Commonwealth	was	formally	a	monarchy	
as	well,	the	dominant	role	played	by	the	parliament	(sejm), the constitutional limits 
put	upon	the	king	(the	Henrician	Articles,	and	later	the	Cardinal	Laws)	and	relatively	
high (for that period) percentage of people eligible to vote made it closer to democ-
racy than to monarchy, applying Hoppe’s criteria.20 The republican (public, not pri-
vate)	character	of	the	state	is	implied	in	its	name	itself.	The	fact	that	the	Targowica	
Confederation proclaimed transforming the Republic into a monarchy the cardinal 
18 H.-H. Hoppe, op.cit., p. 18 (footnote).
19 Ibidem, p. 18 (footnote).
20 According to the research carried out by Tadeusz Korzon, the nobility in 1791 amounted to 8,2% 
of the population of the Republic (725 thousand out of about 8,7 million citizens) – see: T. Korzon, 
Wewnętrzne dzieje Polski za Stanisława Augusta (1764 – 1794) badania historyczne ze stanowiska 
ekonomicznego i administracyjnego, volume 1,	 ed.	 2,	Kraków-Warszawa,	 1897,	 p.	 321.	Since	only	
the	noblemen	had	 the	 right	 to	 vote,	 it	may	be	 assumed	 that	 it	was	 about	 4%	of	 the	whole	 society.	
This	number	 is	comparable	with	Great	Britain,	where	until	1832	the	right	 to	vote	 in	 the	election	of	
the	House	of	Commons	was	given	to	about	5%	of	the	adult	population	–	see:	O.	Majkowska,	Pozycja 
parlamentu brytyjskiego w świetle działania systemu dwupartyjnego, doctoral dissertation under the 
guidance	of	Jan	Iwanek	at	Faculty	of	Social	Sciences,	University	of	Silesia	in	Katowice,	2008,	p.	54.	
„Elective monarchies as they existed for periods of time in Poland, Bohemia, and Hungary, for instance, 
are	obviously	less	monarchic	than	are	hereditary	monarchies.	Likewise,	«constitutional»	monarchies	
are	less	monarchic	than	preconstitutional	ones.	And	«parliamentary»	monarchies	may	well	have	to	be	
placed	closer	to	a	democracy	than	to	a	monarchy,	or,	with	universal	suffrage,	they	may	be	no	monarchy	
at all.” H.-H. Hoppe, op.cit.,	p.	18	(footnote).	It	is	not	clear	if	Hoppe	is	aware	that	monarchy	in	Poland	
before	the	partition	was	not	only	elective,	but	also	“constitutional,”	parliamentarian	and	characterized	
by	relatively	common	right	to	vote.	In	the	introduction	to	the	Polish	edition	of	his	work,	Hoppe	writes	
that: “Poland was once an aristocratic country.”
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sin of the parliament of 1791 implies that the nobility – at least until the 18th century 
– did not consider this form of government a monarchy. 21
Even	though	the	king	was	the	head	of	the	state	(he	was	chosen	by	the	whole	of	
the nobility and theoretically any nobleman could be chosen to become the king), 
his	 power	was	 highly	 limited.	The	 chosen	monarch	was	 obliged	 to	 pledge	pacta 
conventa	–	an	obligation	to	fulfil	his	policy	–	before	the	coronation.	They	included	
the	Henrician	Articles	 –	 constitutional	 laws	 that	 guaranteed,	 e.g.	 the	 principle	 of	
choosing	the	king	by	the	nobility,	religious	freedom,	the	prohibition	of	waging	wars	
without	the	permission	of	the	parliament,	the	obligation	to	convening	the	parliament	
at	 least	once	every	 two	years,	 the	supervision	of	 the	ruler	by	 the	sixteen-member	
council chosen during the parliament assembly and reporting to him, the prohibition 
of	levying	taxes,	tariffs	and	monopolies	without	the	permission	of	the	parliament,	
the nobility’s right to possess independent courts, property right of the nobility’s 
lands, the obligation to sponsor the defence of the country from the kwarta levied 
on the lessees of the royal goods and the right of the citizens (nobility) to disobey 
the	monarch	in	case	he	violated	their	rights	or	freedoms	or	did	not	fulfil	his	policies.	
Surprisingly,	the	last	right	was	not	just	an	empty	promise,	but	it	was	actually	used	
by the nobility.22
The	highest	legislative	power	(including	imposing	taxes)	was	held	by	sejm and 
the	king	was	only	a	part	thereof	–	one	of	the	three	groups	in	power	(the	remaining	
ones	were	senat	who	consisted	of	bishops,	castellans	and	voivodes	appointed	for	a	
lifetime	by	the	king	from	the	local	nobility	and	some	of	the	central	officials;	and	izba 
poselska consisting of members chosen by the nobility during the land parliaments – 
regional nobility assemblies). Resolutions of the sejm (if	it	was	not	the	so-called	con-
federal	sejm)	required	achieving	consensus	(understood	in	such	a	strict	way	that	the	
lack of agreement from even one deputy could result not only in not ratifying a par-
ticular	resolution,	but	also	in	breaking	the	assembly	without	making	any	decisions).	
Deputies of sejm were	bound	by	instructions	given	to	them	by	their	land	parliaments	
and	were	obliged	to	report	to	them.	Land	parliaments	were	also	based	on	consensus,	
however,	some	decisions,	mostly	those	concerning	elections,	were	made	by	means	of	
the majority voting.23 In the 17th	century,	when	sejm began to be notoriously broken, 
21 W. Stanek, Konfederacje generalne koronne w XVIII wieku,	Toruń,	Wydawnictwo	Adam	Marszałek,	
1991, p. 171.
22 The Henrician Articles, retrieved March 20, 2016 from: http://prawnik.trybunal.gov.pl/wszechnica/
akty/art_henr.htm.	 An	example	of	official	disobedience	of	a	part	of	the	nobility	was	the	act	of	rebellion	
against Sigismund III Vasa launched on June 24th 1607 (see: H. Wisner, Zygmunt III Waza,	Wrocław-
Warszawa-Kraków,	Zakład	Narodowy	im.	Ossolińskich,	1991,	p.	96).	Even	though	the	revolutionaries	
were	violently	defeated,	in	practice	–	except	for	few	individuals	–	they	were	not	punished	in	any	way	
(Ibidem, p. 99).
23  A.	Pawiński,	Rządy sejmikowe w epoce królów elekcyjnych. Tom I.	Warszawa,	1888,	pp.	72-74;	A.	
Lityński,	Sejmiki ziemskie 1764-1793. Dzieje reformy,	Katowice,	1988,	pp.	33;	141.
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land parliaments became virtually the only institutions responsible for levying and 
collecting taxes, creating army and organizing mass uprising (pospolite ruszenie).24 
Land	parliaments	were	also	responsible	for	the	choice	of	judges	for	General	Courts	
(courts	of	appeal	for	the	civil	and	criminal	law	cases	of	the	nobility)	and	Treasury	
Courts	(that	controlled	the	state’s	finances	and	carried	out	trials	in	fiscal	law	cases),	
as	well	as	judges	for	so-called	sądy kapturowe (lit.	hood	courts)	that	were	courts	act-
ing during the interregna.25	Except	for	this	formal	government	structure,	there	was	
an additional form of self-organization of the nobility in critical situations based on 
the	tradition.	Nobles	used	to	associate	into	sworn	relations	–	confederations,	which	
especially in the 18th	century,	as	general	confederations,	were	alternatives	for	state	
institutions	with	 their	own	army,	 laws,	finances	and	 sometimes	even	 foreign	pol-
icy.26 The constant governing bodies of the confederations, council marshals and 
committees,	were	chosen	during	general	assemblies	and	the	representatives	of	the	
general confederate councils during confederate parliaments assemblies.27
It	should	be	noted	that	the	right	to	vote	did	not	depend	on	the	property	qualifica-
tion	–	as	it	was,	e.g.	in	Great	Britain	–	but	on	the	membership	of	the	nobility.	Most	
people	entitled	to	vote	were	nobles	who	were	not	land-owners:	lessees,	officials	and	
poor	nobles	cultivating	 their	own,	minute,	piece	of	 land	similarly	 to	peasantry	or	
landless nobles.28 The right to vote during land parliaments assemblies (hence, the 
elections) became limited to nobles of possession (landlords paying taxes in goods, 
their	sons,	pledgees	and	possessor	on	the	condition	that	they	were	paying	a	special	
100	zloties	tax	used	to	maintain	the	army	and	servicemen	who	were	in	possession	of	
land	for	their	achievements	–	as	long	as	they	were	not	subjects	to	the	superior	private	
authority	or	they	were	not	obliged	to	serve	privately)	by	the	law	of	March	24,	1791.	
Some	of	 these	regulations	were	rendered	null	and	void	by	 the	 laws	of	crown	and	
Lithuanian parliaments in 1793.29
Even	considering	such	strict	limits	of	the	power	of	a	monarch	and	public	gov-
ernment	ownership	(even	though	it	belonged	to	a	part	of	society,	not	the	whole),	as	
well	as	the	diversification	of	the	wealth	of	people	allowed	to	vote	(which,	according	
to	Hoppe,	creates	a	 tendency	towards	redistribution:	„It	can	be	expected	 that	ma-
jorities	of	«have-nots»	will	relentlessly	try	to	enrich	themselves	at	 the	expense	of	
24  A.	Pawiński,	Rządy sejmikowe..., op. cit., pp. 377-378.
25  Ibidem,	pp.	300;	319-320.
26  W. Stanek, Konfederacje generalne..., op. cit.,	pp.	55;	114-131;	146-162.	An	example	could	be	an	
alliance	with	Russia	formed	by	the	general	Sandomierz	confederacy	(created	by	August	II)	of	August	
30,	1704	(see:	E.	Rostworowski,	Historia Powszechna wiek XVIII,	ed.	4.	Warszawa:	PWN,	1994,	p.	
239).
27  Ibidem,	pp.	46;	67-71;	80.	Targowica	Confederation	can	be	considered	an	exception	since	its	council	
committee	was	created	by	means	of	co-option	(Ibidem, pp. 84-85).
28  T. Korzon, Wewnętrzne dzieje Polski..., op. cit., p. 331.
29		A.	Lityński,	Sejmiki ziemskie..., op. cit.,	Katowice,	pp.	126-127;	182.	
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minorities of «haves.»”30),	the	level	of	the	extortion	by	the	state	was	not	high	in	the	
Republic	of	Poland	when	compared	to	neighbouring	countries.	In	1700	its	annual	
income	amounted	to	24	tonnes	of	silver,	whereas	Prussi’s	and	Russia’s	income	was	
60 tonnes, Austria’s – 200 tonnes, Great Britain’s – 440 tonnes and France’s – 750 
tonnes.	While	in	1788	it	increased	to	60	tonnes	of	silver,	the	difference	between	the	
Republic	and	neighbours	grew	as	well:	Prussia	had	the	annual	income	of	425	tonnes,	
Russia – 900 tonnes, Austria – 960 tonnes, Great Britain – 1760 tonnes and France 
– 2250 tonnes.31	The	absolute	monarchies	(with	an	exception	of	Great	Britain)	ex-
perienced a much more rapid increase in their annual income. If one argues that the 
decisive factor in this case could be the population of given countries, other data can 
be	presented	–	taxes	per	one	person	in	1785	were	as	follows:	in	Holland	–	36	shil-
lings, Great Britain – 34 shillings, France – 21 shillings, Habsburg Monarchy – 12 
shillings,	Spain	–	10	shillings,	Sweden	–	9	shillings,	Russia	and	Prussia	–	6	shillings,	
Poland – 1 shilling.32
One	might	still	argue	that	the	difference	was	a	result	of	lower	productivity	of	
Poland’s	economy	in	comparison	with	its	neighbours.	It	is	true	that	its	economy	
was	less	productive,	however,	not	that	much	as	to	create	such	a	great	difference.	
According to Van Zanden, assuming the GDP per capita in Great Britain in 1820 
as	100,	GDP	per	capita	in	Poland	in	1700	was	40-46,	and	in	1750	–	34-37.33 Re-
spectively, in Great Britain – 68 and 81, in Holland – 97 and 95, in Italy – 71 and 
62-66, in Spain – 50-56 and 51-53. Similar data (also assuming the GDP of Great 
Britain	 in	1820	as	100)	was	presented	by	Pamuk	and	Van	Zanden	 in	The Cam-
bridge Economic History of Modern Europe: Poland – 38-42 in 1700 and 34-37 
in 1750. Respectively, Great Britain – 73 and 87, Holland 109 and 109, Italy – 71 
and	76,	Spain	–	61	and	58,	Sweden	–	66	and	67.34	According	to	Orłowski,	GDP	
per	capita	in	Poland	in	1700	was	about	55%	of	the	GDP	of	the	Eastern	European	
countries (present-day Germany, France, England, Italy) and in 1850 it decreased 
to 45%.35	According	to	A.	and	G.	Wójtowicz,	per	capita	income	in	Poland	in	1700	
was	39,2%	of	the	per	capita	income	in	Western	Europe,	in	1720	–	35,8%,	and	in	
1790 – 46,5%.36 These data imply that the abovementioned difference in the av-
30  H.-H. Hoppe, op. cit, p. 96.
31  E.	Rostworowski,	Historia Powszechna..., op. cit., p. 100.
32 Ibidem, p. 103
33  J. Luiten van Zanden, Early modern economic growth. A survey of the European economy, in M. 
Prak (ed.), Early Modern Capitalism: Economic and Social Change in Europe 1400-1800, Taylor & 
Francis e-Library, 2005, p. 74.
34  S. Pamuk, J. Luiten van Zanden, The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe: Volume 1, 
1700–1870, Chapter 9 “Standards of living”, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 221.
35  W.	Orłowski,	Rozwój i załamania: gospodarka polska w ostatnim tysiącleciu, retrieved 16 April 
2016 from:  http://www.nobe.pl/gospodarka-pol-1000.htm, chart: http://www.nobe.pl/hist-wyk4.htm
36	 G.	 Wójtowicz,	 A.	 Wójtowicz,	 Dlaczego nie jesteśmy bogaci? Dystans gospodarki polskiej do 
zachodnioeuropejskiej,	Warszawa,	CeDeWu,	2009,	p.43.
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erage	fiscal	burden	upon	Polish	citizens	in	comparison	with	other	countries	was	
mainly	the	result	of	the	lower	tax	extortion	rate.	
What	is	also	noteworthy	is	that	citizens	eligible	to	vote	–	the	nobility	–	until	a	
certain	point	in	history	were	not	obliged	to	pay	taxes.37	The	burden	of	taxation	was	
imposed	mostly	–	as	was	 the	case	with	absolute	monarchies	–	on	 those,	who	did	
not	have	 the	 right	 to	vote,	 i.e.	peasants,	 townsmen	and	Jews.	Most	 taxes	 (pobory 
sejmowe,	general	poll	tax	until	1717)	were	not	permanent	and	they	were	levied	only	
when	it	was	necessary	–	due	to	a	war,	usually	defensive	one	(since	the	nobility	was	
not	willing	to	give	a	permission	to	the	fight	and	to	sponsor	the	army	unless	there	was	
a direct threat upon them).38 Only in the second half of the 18th	century	did	fiscal	
reforms introduce taxes that burdened the nobility to a higher degree (mostly taxes 
that	were	designed	to	maintain	the	army).39
The	Commonwealth	was	burdened	by	much	smaller	debt	than	Eastern-European	
monarchies. While at the turn of the 18th century the annual income of the state of 
Great Britain amounted to one-fifteenth of its debt (16 mln pounds of income com-
pared to 260 mln of debt), France – one-tenth (500 mln livres of income – 5 bln livres 
of	debt),	Austria	–	one-fifth	(80	mln	guldens	of	income	–	360	mln	guldens	of	debt),	
Poland’s	debt	was	about	20	mln	zloties	balanced	with	similar	sum	of	the	annual	in-
come.40 One could include the private debt of the king, Stanisław	II	August	that	in	
1790	was	17,5	mln	zloties	and	in	1793	–	33	mln	zloties,	but	they	did	not	represent	
willingness	of the “public” government of	the	Commonwealth	to	get	into	debt,	but	
only an individual preference	of	the	king,	who	hoped	that	his	debt	would	be	paid	
with	 someone	 else’s	money	 (indeed,	 the	 state	 did	 pay	 the	 debts	 of	 the	monarchs	
twice).41
As	 regards	wars,	 even	 though	 the	Commonwealth	was	engaged	 in	 some,	 they	
were	rarely	aggressive.	As	mentioned	above,	the	king	had	no	constitutional	right	to	
wage	a	war	without	the	permission	of	sejm, nor did he have money to do so since 
it required introducing special taxes by sejm (the	 regular	 income	of	 the	state	was	
only	enough	to	maintain	several	thousands	of	soldiers	whose	responsibility	was	to	
patrol and defend the borders).42	The	Republic	fought	only	several	wars	that	could	
be	considered	an	act	of	aggression,	and	 they	were	clearly	 initiatives	of	 the	kings.	
37	 B.	 Markowski,	 Administracja Skarbowa w Polsce,	 Warszawa,	 Wyższa	 Szkoła	 Handlowa	 w	
Warszawie,	1931,	p.	25.
38  Ibidem, p. 25. Z. Gloger, Encyklopedja staropolska ilustrowana,	t.	IV,	Warszawa,	1903,	p.	52.
39		B.	Markowski,	op. cit.,	pp.	36-37;	Z.	Gloger,	op. cit.,	p.	51;		A.	Jezierski,	C.	Leszczyńska,	Historia 
gospodarcza Polski,	Warszawa,	Wydawnictwo	Key	Text,	2003,	p.	95.
40  E.	Rostworowski,	op. cit.,	pp.	100;	103-104;	Z.	Szpringer,	Publiczne zadłużenie Polski z perspektywy 
historycznej,	Analizy	BAS,	no.	2	(69),	Biuro	Analiz	Sejmowych,	2012,	p.	2/14.	
41  Ibidem,	p.	2/14	(footnote);	A.	Jezierski,	C.	Leszczyńska,	op. cit., p. 96.
42  E.g. in 1646 sejm objected	to	waging	war	with	Turkey,	forcing	Vladislaus	IV	Vasa	to	abandon	his	
military plans (see: J. Ekes, Złota demokracja,	Warszawa,	Instytut	Wydawniczy	PAX,	1987,	p.	235).
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In 1598 sejm gave a permission to Sigismund III Vasa to carry an armed venture to 
Sweden	in	order	to	protect	the	Swedish	crown	that	hereditarily	belonged	to	him.43 
In	1609,	without	the	permission	of	sejm,	but	with	the	approval	of	senat, Sigismund 
III	Vasa	organised	a	military	intervention	in	Russia,	however,	it	was	after	a	period	
of	time	when	Polish	nobility,	lords	and	brawlers	had	been	privately	engaged	in	the	
Russian	civil	war	started	in	1605,	with	the	unofficial	support	for	the	pretender	for	the	
throne by the Polish king.44	In	1700,	Augustus	II	the	Strong	attacked	Sweden	and	
started	the	Great	Northern	War,	however,	he	did	so	not	as	a	monarch	of	Poland,	but	
as	an	elector	of	Saxony,	his	simultaneous	office,	using	Saxon	army.45 As a result, the 
Commonwealth	became	the	victim	of	Swedish	invasion	and	joined	the	war	formally	
in 1704.46
The	army	of	the	Commonwealth	was	not	large,	and	in	the	18th	century	it	was	ex-
ceptionally small. Until the second half of the 17th century the standing army respon-
sible or defending borders (so-called kwarciana army	maintained	with	a	special	tax	
called kwarta – a part of the royal income from the royal goods, zhupas and tariffs) 
was	comprised	of	several	thousand	soldiers.	In	case	of	a	threat	it	was	supported	by	
registered	Cossacks	(several	thousand	as	well)	and	private	troops.	Additional	forc-
es (supplementary army), including pospolite ruszenie,	were	organized	only	in	the	
event	of	a	war.	In	the	18th century, during a period of peace, the army of the Republic 
amounted to 12-18 thousand soldiers (not including private troops) – incomparably 
less than that of France (150-180 thousand), Spain (80 thousand), Russia (130-200 
thousand),	Prussia	 (83-186	 thousand),	 less	 than	Great	Britain	 (15-30	 thousand;	 in	
case	of	a	war	70-100	thousand),	even	less	than	such	countries	as	Saxony,	Bavaria,	
Denmark, Kingdom of Naples and Sicily, Kingdom of Sardinia or Portugal.47 While 
standing armies of most European states constituted about 1% of the population (in 
Prussia	–	3%),	in	Poland	it	was	0,1-0,2%.48 In 1792, in the face of a critical threat 
the	fixed	number	of	standing	army	was	set	on	57,5	thousand	soldiers	(insufficient	
finances	did	not	allow	to	increase	it	to	previously	planned	number	of	100	thousand).	
Ultimately,	70	thousand	soldiers	were	organized	to	fight	the	war	with	Russia,	out	of	
which	only	40	thousand	were	actually	used	in	battle.49
The	 example	 of	 the	Republic	 of	 Poland	 compared	with	monarchies	 that	most	
accurately correspond to Hoppe’s use of the term, clearly contradicts his thesis. The 
43 H. Wisner, Zygmunt III Waza,	Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków,	 Zakład	Narodowy	 im.	Ossolińskich,	
1991, p. 72.
44  Ibidem,	pp.	108;	117.
45		E.	Rostworowski,	op. cit., p. 238.
46	Making	a	treaty	with	Russia	by	the	Sandomierz	Confederation	on	August	30th, 1704 (see the previous 
footnote). 
47		E.	Rostworowski,	op. cit., pp. 97-98.
48  Ibidem, p. 98.
49	A.	Jezierski,	C.	Leszczyńska,	op. cit.,	pp.	69;	96.
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Commonwealth,	which	according	to	his	definition,	was	much	more	similar	 to	de-
mocracy than to monarchy – and most certainly being an example of a publicly 
owned	state	–	on	average,	had	much	lower	fiscal	burden,	much	smaller	debt	and	was	
less	willing	to	engage	in	wars	than	typical	European	absolute	monarchies.
4. Leopold II of Belgium’s rule in the Congo Free State vs. his rule in Belgium
Another	noteworthy	example	could	be	drawing	a	comparison	between	Leopold	
II of Belgium’s rule in the Congo Free State from 1885 until 1908 and his rule dur-
ing	the	same	period	in	Belgium,	as	well	as	other,	neighbouring	African	colonies.	In	
Belgium,	Leopold	II	was	a	constitutional	monarch	–	his	power	was	limited	by	the	
parliament	that	was	chosen	only	by	the	richest	social	groups	(in	1894,	only	10%	of	
adult	males	were	eligible	to	vote	for	the	candidates	to	the	House	of	Representatives	
and	only	1000	out	of	6	mln	citizens	were	eligible	to	vote	for	candidates	to	the	Upper	
House;	after	 introducing	an	amendment	 to	 the	constitution,	1,3	mln	citizens	were	
granted the right to vote for the candidates to the House of Representatives and 2000 
–	to	the	Upper	House,	however,	half	of	the	officials	in	this	institution	was	chosen	
by provincial councils) – and his legal acts required a countersignature of ministers, 
who	could	be	prosecuted	if	the	House	of	Representatives	decided	they	had	broken	
the	law.50	The	constitution	of	Belgium	stated	that	the	power	to	rule	comes	from	the	
nation.	In	Congo,	on	the	other	hand,	Leopold	was	„the	sole	arbiter	of	and	legislator	
for the destinies of the Congo Natives”.51	He	was	 an	 absolute	 sovereign	 and	 the	
only	source	of	the	legislative,	executive	and	judicial	power,	not	bound	by	any	con-
stitutional regulations, but only by international treaties that included Congo as their 
party.52	His	rule	over	this	territory	was	an	archetypical	example	of	what	Hoppe	calls	
the	“private	government	ownership.”
During the reign of Leopold, free trade that had been developing rapidly in Con-
go	was	destroyed	by	banning	local	traders	from	selling	ivory	and	natural	rubber	(and	
even other products, such as manioc bread) to European merchants operating on that 
territory.53	The	formal	basis	for	such	a	law	was	proclaiming	the	whole	of	the	“emp-
ty” land – meaning the non-built-up areas and non-farmed land – the state’s proper-
ty.54 As noted by Morel, it resulted in transforming the natives of the land from the 
landowners	into	the	subjects	living	on	the	government	land.55
50  B. Cook, Belgium: A History,	New	York,	Peter	Lang	Publishing,	2005,	p.	64;	M.	Vauthier,	“The	New	
Belgian Constitution”, in Political Science Quarterly,	Vol.	9,	No.	4,	1894,	pp.	722-723;	725.
51  E. D. Morel, King Leopold’s rule in Africa, London, William Heinemann, 1904, introduction.
52  Ibidem, pp. 20-22.
53 Ibidem, pp. 39-43.
54 Ibidem, p. 78.
55 Ibidem, p. 32.
Jacek Sierpiński A Critique of Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s Thesis...
Res Publica. Revista de Historia de las Ideas Políticas    
Vol. 19 Núm. 2 (2016): 521-559
534
The	majority	 of	 the	Congo’s	 territory	was	 given,	 by	means	 of	 concession,	 to	
trusts	–	companies	of	which	the	majority	of	the	shares	were	held	by	the	government	
– and used as the private royal lands (Domaine de la Couronne).56 Citizens living in 
other	areas	became	burdened	with	taxes	paid	in	nature	(mostly	in	natural	rubber,	but	
also in other products or public service).57	These	taxes	were	quite	high	–	the	capital	
gains	of	the	state	in	1899	were	19130000	francs	and	in	1900	–	14991300	francs.58 In 
comparison	with	Congo’s	export	in	1899	–	36067959	francs	and	in	1900	–	47377401	
francs,	they	constituted	respectively	53%	and	32%.	These	taxes	were	a	significant	
part	 of	 the	 state’s	 income	 (from	1898	fluctuating	 between	 40%	 and	 58%),	 being	
incomparably higher than in British, French and German colonies in Africa.59 Until 
1903	they	were	imposed	arbitrarily	by	local	government	officials	and	in	November	
of	1903,	they	were	fixed	on	the	maximum	of	40	hours	of	public	service	per	month	–	
however,	in	reality,	it	did	not	have	any	considerable	effect.60
What	is	more,	the	taxes	in	question	were	not	the	only	form	of	taxation	and	extor-
tion of the citizens of Congo by king Leopold.
Until the debates of 1903 in the Belgian House, public opinion in Belgium and out-
side	of	it	was	made	to	understand	that	the	taxation	of	natives	in	the	Domaine	Privé	
represented the summum of “taxation” exacted from the natives of the Congo. The 
Congo	Government,	 in	 official	 documents,	 its	 apologists,	 official	 and	 unofficial,	
and	its	paid	writers	in	the	Press,	have	declared	over	and	over	again	that	the	whole	
amount	derived	from	the	“taxation”	of	the	natives	appeared	in	the	Budget	[…].	It	
was	then	made	clear	for	the	first	time	that,	in	addition	to	the	Government	“taxes”	
required	of	the	natives	“for	benefits	rendered,”	in	the	Domaine	Privé stricto sensu, 
“taxes”	were	imposed	upon	the	natives	in	a	special	section	of	the	Domaine	Privé,	
called Domaine de la Couronne, not for the Government purposes, but for account 
and on behalf of the Sovereign-King.61
In	reality,	this	could	be	considered	compulsory	labour	–	work	slavery	–	since	if	
people	refused	to	do	that,	 they	were	killed	–	there	are	records	of	massive	killings	
committed for this very reason.62
56 Ibidem,	p.	73;	M.	Ma	Khenzu,	A Modern History of Monetary and Financial Systems of Congo 1885-
1995,	2003,	pp.	91-95;	356	(map)	(PhD	thesis).
57 Ibidem, p. 97.
58 E. D. Morel, op. cit., p. 66.
59 Ibidem,	p.	56;	M.	Ma	Khenzu,	op. cit., pp. 99-100.
60 Ibidem, pp. 97-98.
61  E. D. Morel, op. cit., pp. 70-71.
62 Ibidem, pp.185-187.
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In	practice,	 compulsory	 labour	was	common	not	only	on	 the	 royal	 and	 state’s	
land, but also on areas administered by trusts.63	Contrary	to	official	statements	claim-
ing	that	the	natives	worked	voluntarily	and	were	offered	a	decent	payment,	they	were	
forced	to	give	up	the	set	amount	of	natural	rubber	by	means	of	violence	(flogging,	
hostage-taking,	burning	villages).	Female	hostages	were	preferred	to	male	and	fail-
ure	to	deliver	the	set	amount	of	products	was	punished	by	cutting	arms	off	or	often	
death.64 As exposed by the Caudron case, it often happened that the Congo’s govern-
ment gave permission to private companies to collect taxes in nature, paying provi-
sion	to	the	government	agents	(which	was	formally	illegal,	as	ruled	by	the	court).65 
In	this	particular	case,	the	worker	of	Société Anversoise du Commerce au Congo was	
sentenced	 to	prison	 for	organizing	 (with	 the	help	of	 the	government)	disciplinary	
expeditions	into	natives’	villages	in	order	to	kill	their	inhabitants.	However,	the	gov-
ernor-general	who	gave	his	permission	for	this	and	none	of	the	government	officials	
involved	were	punished	in	any	way	whatsoever.66
If	Congolese	were	paid	for	their	work	at	all,	they	were	paid	little,	below	the	max-
imum	prices	set	by	the	government,	in	worthless	goods.67
The army of the Congo Free State comprised 20 thousand soldiers, not includ-
ing armed forces maintained by trusts – approximately 10 thousand soldiers. Even 
though	considering	European	countries,	this	was	a	ludicrously	small	number,	in	Af-
rica it could be regarded as large armed forces, much bigger than Britain’s forces in 
Western Africa (8000), France’s in French Western Africa (12000) or Germany’s in 
Cameroon and Togo (1800).68	Its	purpose	was	not	fighting	any	external	enemy	(only	
in	the	beginnings	of	the	state’s	existence	they	fought	Arabs	who	had	controlled	the	
Eastern	part	of	the	country),	but	terrorizing	civilians	in	order	to	force	them	into	work	
slavery.	Congo’s	soldiers	murdered	and	crippled	men,	women	and	children	–	it	was	
a common practice to cut off arms both of those dead and alive.69 Another common 
occurrence	was	cannibalism	–	even	with	the	permission	of	European	sergeants.70 It 
is	worth	to	point	out	that	spending	on	army	and	police	was	significantly	higher	than	
in other European colonies in Africa (e.g. British) and amounted even to 60% of the 
government	spending,	rarely	decreasing	below	40%.71 In the course of time, Congo 
63 M. Ma Khenzu, op. cit., p. 115.
64 E. D. Morel, op. cit.,	pp.	131;	157-158;	166-167;	169;	247.
65 M. Ma Khenzu, op. cit.,	p.	83;	E.	D.	Morel,	op. cit.,	pp.	143;	146-147.
66 Ibidem, pp. 139-141, 145-146.
67 M. Ma Khenzu, op. cit.,	pp.	57;	162.
68 E. D. Morel, op. cit., pp. 105-106.
69 Ibidem, pp. 110-114.
70 Ibidem, pp. 120-121.
71 L. Gardner, The Fiscal History of the Belgian Congo in Comparative Perspective”, Workshop: 
Colonial Extortion and Economic Development: The Belgian Congo and the Dutch East Indies 
Compared.	University	of	Antwerp,	2011,	 retrieved	16	April	2016,	 from:	http://vkc.library.uu.nl/vkc/
seh/research/Lists/Events/Attachments/12/CH11.Leigh%20Gardner%20-%20Congo%20fiscal%20
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developed a highly complex and costly administration that is considered as probably 
the best organized colonial administration of that time.72
Murders	and	terror,	along	with	forced,	exhausting	labour,	resulted	in	depopula-
tion	of	whole	areas	in	the	country.	It	is	estimated	that	during	the	reign	of	king	Leo-
pold,	the	population	of	Congo	decreased	by	5	up	to	20	million	people,	which	can	be	
considered one of the most extensive genocide in human history.73
The	example	of	the	Congo	Free	State	shows	that,	contrary	to	predictions	implied	
by Hoppe’s theory, the rule of the same person, acting as an absolute monarch – a 
private	owner	of	the	government	–	was	characterized	by	much	greater	destruction	
and violation of property rights (even on the most basic level of self-possession), 
much greater tax burden and much greater military aggression (though addressed 
mostly	towards	civilians)	than	the	rule	of	the	constitutional	monarch,	limited	by	the	
parliament chosen through (to a large extent) democratic process.
As regards the debt of the Congo Free State, despite such an excessive extortion 
of	the	citizens,	in	1905	it	was	more	than	130	mln	francs	(only	a	part	of	it	was	in-
cluded	in	the	official	budget	reports),	which	was	430%	of	the	annual	income	of	the	
state.74	The	money	from	loans	was	spent	(by	the	king	himself)	on	purposes	that	did	
not	have	anything	to	do	with	Congo.75 Such a rapid increase of the debt during the 
period	of	peace	makes	one	doubt	whether	the	tendency	of	the	governments	to	reduce	
debt	during	the	periods	between	wars	during	the	“monarchical	age”,	as	observed	by	
Hoppe,	was	indeed	the	result	of	the	frugality	and	greater	foresight	of	a	monarch	–	a	
private	government	owner.76
5. Democratic and non-democratic governments in the 20th and 21st century
According to Hoppe, the end of the World War I can be regarded as the beginning 
of	 the	“democratic-republican	age”	–	“the	point	 in	 time	at	which	private	govern-
ment	ownership	was	completely	replaced	by	public	government	ownership.”77 He 
writes:	“Everywhere,	universal	adult	suffrage	was	introduced	[…].	A	new	era	–	the	
democratic-republican age under the aegis of a dominating U.S. government – had 
begun.”78 While pointing out that at that time the negative phenomena that he asso-
system.pdf, p. 7.
72 Ibidem, p. 8.
73 E. D. Morel, op.cit.,	pp.	182;	185;	221;	238-241;	R.	J.	Rummel,	Exemplifying the Horror of European 
Colonization: Leopold’s Congo,	 retrieved	 16	 April	 2016	 from:	 http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/
COMM.7.1.03.HTM.
74 M. Ma Khenzu,  op. cit., p. 107.
75 Ibidem, p. 109.
76 H.-H. Hoppe, op. cit., p. 59.
77 Ibidem, p. 42.
78 Ibidem, pp. 41-42.
Jacek Sierpiński A Critique of Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s Thesis...
Res Publica. Revista de Historia de las Ideas Políticas 
Vol. 19 Núm. 2 (2016): 521-559
537
ciates	with	the	high	time	preference	characteristic	of	democracy	were	increasing,	he	
disregards	the	fact	that	even	after	this	point	in	history	there	were	–	and	there	still	are	
–	many	non-democratic	states,	where	the	rulers	are	not	subjects	to	any	regulations	
from	voters	or	parliaments,	including	dictatorships,	where	the	ruler	has	the	power	
of the absolute monarch. Formally, such states do not need to be monarchies (they 
might be called republics, they might have mock-republican institutions and even 
mock	elections)	and	their	rulers	do	not	need	to	have	the	title	of	the	formal	owner	
of	the	state.	However,	from	the	point	of	view	of	Hoppe,	they	should	be	considered	
monarchs	rather	than	democratic	rulers:	they	owe	their	status	to	their	own	achieve-
ments	(or	the	achievements	of	their	ancestors	from	whom	they	inherit	the	power	as	
in	e.g.	North	Korea,	Togo	or	Syria),	they	are	not	just	civil	servants	chosen	for	office	
for	a	particular	period	of	 time;	people	are	not	equally	capable	of	getting	 into	 the	
public	offices,	but	 it	 is	dependent	on	 their	will.79 While claiming that present-day 
monarchies,	such	as	Great	Britain,	Belgium,	Sweden,	Norway,	Denmark	or	Spain,	
“are clearly monarchies in name only” (and they are actually democracies), Hoppe 
himself	seems	to	admit	that	the	reality	(of	how	the	state	is	governed)	is	more	im-
portant than formal terminology.80	Since,	from	his	point	of	view,	it	seems	obvious	
that formal monarchies that in practice ruled by people chosen through elections 
are democracies, it should be equally obvious that formal republics governed by an 
irrevocable (and often hereditary) dictator, are monarchies.
However,	 it	 seems	 that	Hoppe	 refuses	 to	 call	 the	 twentieth-century	 and	 pres-
ent-day dictatorships monarchies. This conclusion could be based on the fact that 
he calls communism, fascism and national socialism simply tyrannies: “arbitrary 
powers,	the	holders	of	which	claim	to	use	it	for	the	people	and	in	fact	appeal	to	the	
people, for support.”81	Even	though	nowhere	in	his	work	does	Hoppe	present	rea-
sons	for	why	such	a	tyranny	could	not	be	considered	a	monarchy,	it	is	worth	to	note	
that he does not regard any ideological legitimation given by the ruler a decisive 
factor. According to his theory, there is no basis to believe that a lifetime autocrat 
who	claims	that	he	uses	his	power	for	the	good	of	his	people	could	not	be	regarded	
as	a	monarch.	On	the	other	hand,	the	power	of	communist,	nazi	or	fascist	dictators	
was	based	mostly	on	force	and	not	on	the	support	of	their	people,	who	did	not	have	
any possibility to change the government through elections and rebellions (in case of 
communism, e.g. the Uprising of 1953 in East Germany, the Hungarian Revolution 
of	 1956,	 the	 “Solidarity”	movement	 of	 1980-1981	 in	 Poland)	were	 violently	 put	
down	as	long	as	the	communist	system	was	strong	enough	to	fight	them.82
79 Ibidem,	pp.	48;	82.
80 Ibidem, p. 18 (footnote).
81 Ibidem, p. 42 (footnote).
82 An	example	of	Adolf	Hitler	 is	commonly	provided	 in	discussions	as	he	came	 into	power	 through	
democratic	process.	It	is	true	that	he	was	appointed	as	chancellor	by	a	democratically	chosen	president	
after	his	political	party	had	won	the	elections	to	Reichstag,	although	it	had	not	obtained	an	absolute	
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Hoppe	classifies	the	soviet	type	of	communism	as	“public	slavery,”	noting	that,	
contrary	to	private	slave-owners,	soviet	rulers	did	not	have	the	right	to	sell	or	let	their	
subjects	on	the	labour	market,	which	he	believes	was	the	reason	for	treating	them	
worse	 than	private	 slaves.83	Not	 to	ponder	over	whether	 this	was	actually	 true,	 it	
can	be	noted	that	in	the	eighteenth-century	monarchies,	monarch	was	not	allowed	to	
manage	their	free	subjects	in	accordance	with	their	own	will,	either.	Hence,	it	is	not	
the	factor	that	enables	one	to	distinguish	between	the	private	government	ownership	
and	public	government	ownership	in	his	theory.	The	private	government	ownership	
(monopoly on jurisdiction and imposing taxes on the particular territory) does not 
necessarily	result	in	private	ownership	of	the	subjects	of	such	government	–	a	situ-
ation	in	which	a	private	government	limits	the	freedom	of	the	citizens	so	much	that	
they	are	virtually	slaves,	but	it	is	not	their	private	owner	allowed	to	trade	them	on	the	
market is logically acceptable. Therefore, this does not make it impossible to regard 
the soviet dictatorship as a kind of a monarchy. What is more, it is not absolutely 
true that soviet-communist rulers did not have the right to sell or let their subjects on 
the	labour	market.	North	Korea	made	profit	–	and	still	does	–	by	letting	its	subjects	
as	workers,	first	to	the	fellow	soviet	regime,	and	now	to	private	companies	abroad,	
as	well.84
It	can	be	assumed,	then,	that	according	to	Hoppe’s	criteria,	twentieth-centu-
ry	and	present	day	dictatorships,	including	communist	and	nazi	regimes	–	with	
special	 emphasis	 put	 on	 the	 case	 of	North	Korea,	where	 the	 dictatorship	 rule	
is one for a lifetime and since 1948 hereditary, and as proved above, it seems 
to	 fulfil	Hoppe’s	 criteria	 of	 a	 private	 slave-owner	–	 are	much	more	 similar	 to	
majority.	However,	after	adapting	the	laws	granting	the	government	special	powers,	the	influence	of	
the	people	on	the	issue	of	removing	him	from	the	office	and	on	the	control	of	his	actions	disappeared	
completely.	The	legislative	power	that	gave	right	to	enforce	decrees	that	were	incompatible	with	the	
constitution	was	in	the	hands	of	the	government,	and	in	practice	–	Hitler	himself.	Next,	a	special	decree	
prohibited all political parties other than National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) from 
taking	part	in	politics	and	mock	elections	were	organized	resulting	in	granting	all	government	offices	to	
the	NSDAP	members.	Until	the	end	of	the	Third	Reich	era,	no	other	elections	were	organized	and	the	
role	of	the	Reichstag	was	only	formally	accepting	Hitler’s	propositions.
83 H.-H. Hoppe, op. cit., p. 42 (footnote).
84 See: a great number of journalistic information, e.g. A. Higgins, In Siberia’s last gulag: Conditions 
in North Korea’s Russian logging camps, originally built for political prisoners, are reminiscent of 
the old Soviet gulag. But North Koreans fight to be sent to them, because from there they can defect. 
Retrieved 16  April 2016 from: http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/in-siberias-last-
gulag-conditions-in-north-koreas-russian-logging-camps-originally-built-for-political-prisoners-
are-reminiscent-of-the-old-soviet-gulag-but-north-koreans-fight-to-be-sent-to-them-because-from-
there-they-can-defect-1425245.html;	 S.	 Smith,	North Korean labor camps in Siberia. Retrieved 16 
April 2016 from: http://edition.cnn.com/2011/12/15/world/asia/north-korean-labor-camps-in-siberia/
index.html;	A.	 Devalpo,	North Korean slaves. Retrieved 16  April 2016 from: http://mondediplo.
com/2006/04/08koreanworkers;	K.	Jin	Mi,	Runaway Loggers on the Rise Due to Wage Cuts. Retrieved 
16 April 2016 from: http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk01300&num=7034.
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monarchy	 than	 to	 democracy.	 How	 could	 they	 be	 compared	 to	 contemporary	
democracies?85
The general degree of economic freedom, and simultaneously the degree of ex-
tortion	by	the	state	–	violating	property	rights	by	the	state	in	different	ways,	such	as	
taxation,	regulations	or	inflation,	as	enumerated	by	Hoppe	–	in	different	countries	
has been measured by Heritage Foundation since 1995 in its Index of Economic 
Freedom. It is based on ten elements: the degree of protection of property rights in 
general,	freedom	from	corruption,	the	degree	of	fiscal	freedom,	the	level	of	govern-
ment spending, the degree of freedom of operating business, the degree of freedom of 
the	labour	market	(since	2005),	the	degree	of	monetary	freedom	(this	factor	reflects	
e.g.	inflation),	the	degree	of	trade	freedom,	the	degree	of	investment	freedom	and	the	
degree	of	financial	freedom.86 The more points the country gets for a particular factor 
(maximum – 100, minimum – 0), the higher the level of particular freedom and the 
lower	the	level	of	the	extortion	by	the	state.	Constituent	grades	for	each	factor	are	
summed	and	the	arithmetic	mean	is	calculated.	This	average	rate	reflects	the	general	
economic freedom – and the extortion by the state – in each country.
While comparing the average grades of democratic and non-democratic states 
(both those rare “traditional” monarchies, such as Saudi Arabia, and those much 
more frequent, modern dictatorships) in this index during 1995-2005 (table 1), it can 
be noticed that the general average degree of the extortion by the state, measured as 
described	above,	 is	 lower	in	democracies	(although	not	much,	 taking	into	consid-
eration the scale of grading from 0 to 100) than in non-democracies.87 As regards 
constituent	grades,	non-democratic	 states	 are	placed	higher	 in	 terms	of	 the	 lower	
government	spending	during	the	whole	period	of	time	in	question,	and	in	2000,	as	
well	as	2003-2015	are	placed	higher	in	terms	of	fiscal	freedom.	Democratic	states	
85 Even	since	1946	if	one	was	to	acknowledge	the	reign	of	Kim	Il-sung	as	the	leader	of	Provisional	
People’s	 Committee	 for	North	Korea	 before	 official	 founding	 of	Democratic	 People’s	 Republic	 of	
Korea.
86 The data for the period since 1995 can be accessed at: http://www.heritage.org/index/explore;	2015 
Index of Economic Freedom, Appendix, Methodology: http://www.heritage.org/index/pdf/2015/book/
methodology.pdf.
87	 The	 distinction	 between	 democratic	 and	 non-democratic	 states	 is	 based	 on	 the	 List	 of	 Electoral	
Democracies, FIW (1989-2015), retrieved 16 April 2016 from: https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/
files/List%20of%20Electoral%20Democracies%2C%20FIW%201989-2015.xls – for the index for 
each	year	 I	have	applied	data	 from	a	previous	year	 (that	 reflect	 the	 situation	of	 the	year	before	 the	
previous year), since the data for the annual Index of Economic Freedom come from the second half 
of	the	year	before	the	previous	year	and	the	first	half	of	the	previous	year	and	some	of	them	include	
preceding	years	as	well	(see:	e.g.	2015	Index of Economic Freedom, Appendix, Methodology: http://
www.heritage.org/index/pdf/2015/book/methodology.pdf, p. 485). The criterion for being considered a 
democracy is obtaining at least 7 points out of 12 in the sub-category of Electoral Process and at least 
20 (out of 40) in the category of Political Rights in the Freedom in the World rating. For details, see: 
https://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2015/methodology,	retrieved	16	April	2016.
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are characterized by higher constituent grades in all other factors considered. The 
most	significant	(and	expanding)	difference	in	favour	of	democratic	states	is	clearly	
visible in the constituent grades concerning the degree of the protection of property 
rights and the degree of investment freedom. Large differences in favour of demo-
cratic	states	can	be	seen	in	the	grades	reflecting	the	trade	freedom,	financial	freedom	
and	business	freedom,	as	well	as	freedom	from	corruption.	Non-democratic	states	
have	slightly	higher	inflation	which	is	reflected	in	the	average	degree	of	monetary	
freedom.
Table 1. The comparison of average grades of democracies and non-democracies 
according to the Index of Economic Freedom, 1995-2015
final 
Grade
property
rights
freedom 
from 
Corruption
fiScal 
freedom
government 
SpendinG
business 
freedom
labour 
freedom
monetary 
freedom
trade 
freedom
investment 
freedom
financial 
freedom
1995
democracieS 60,9 62,1 43,4 65,1 60,8 71,5 N/A 62,3 62,5 63,8 56,9
non-democracieS 52,5 47,3 34,0 61,3 68,8 64,0 N/A 55,9 48,0 48,5 44,5
1996
democracieS 60,3 61,5 47,5 65,5 56,7 69,0 N/A 63,2 62,0 61,5 56,1
non-democracieS 51,7 46,3 34,2 62,8 65,8 62,2 N/A 56,1 51,4 44,6 41,5
1997
democracieS 60,9 62,6 46,9 65,0 58,2 69,0 N/A 65,1 62,9 61,5 57,4
non-democracieS 51,3 44,6 30,5 63,7 69,8 61,1 N/A 57,7 49,8 44,0 40,9
1998
democracieS 61,2 60,9 46,9 65,8 59,6 68,1 N/A 67,7 64,0 61,3 56,4
non-democracieS 50,6 41,6 28,2 63,5 72,5 59,4 N/A 55,5 53,0 42,1 39,3
1999
democracieS 61,9 61,3 47,0 66,9 60,1 67,8 N/A 71,6 65,0 61,8 56,2
non-democracieS 50,8 40,3 28,4 64,5 73,9 57,9 N/A 61,7 52,8 41,1 36,7
2000
democracieS 62,6 61,0 46,4 67,2 62,9 67,7 N/A 74,6 66,4 61,7 55,4
non-democracieS 51,3 38,9 29,0 67,7 72,0 57,8 N/A 65,3 53,5 41,3 36,6
2001
democracieS 63,4 60,2 46,6 68,5 66,2 67,6 N/A 76,6 67,5 61,4 55,7
non-democracieS 51,9 37,2 29,8 68,0 70,6 56,8 N/A 69,7 57,8 40,5 36,8
2002
democracieS 63,4 57,7 45,7 70,0 64,6 66,4 N/A 77,0 69,4 61,7 58,1
non-democracieS 51,9 33,6 29,8 68,7 70,7 56,0 N/A 71,9 56,7 42,1 37,8
2003
democracieS 63,1 56,1 45,0 71,0 64,1 66,9 N/A 77,4 68,1 59,3 59,5
non-democracieS 53,4 35,0 29,6 72,1 74,1 56,1 N/A 73,0 57,0 42,9 40,9
2004
democracieS 63,1 56,1 45,9 71,1 61,8 67,3 N/A 78,8 68,3 58,7 60,1
non-democracieS 53,4 33,4 28,8 73,2 74,6 56,3 N/A 73,4 58,4 41,4 40,9
2005
democracieS 63,3 56,5 46,9 71,6 60,8 67,8 62,0 79,4 70,8 56,9 59,9
non-democracieS 53,7 32,0 29,2 75,8 74,2 56,3 58,3 73,2 60,7 38,7 39,0
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2006
democracieS 64,1 56,3 47,6 72,6 62,3 69,0 62,6 79,9 72,4 58,0 60,3
non-democracieS 53,4 31,6 29,2 75,7 72,9 51,0 57,8 73,0 61,5 39,7 41,8
2007
democracieS 60,1 45,6 41,2 74,5 67,3 62,7 60,5 75,2 72,0 49,6 52,0
non-democracieS 53,9 30,2 31,3 77,7 74,1 52,7 57,9 71,2 66,0 37,3 40,7
2008
democracieS 63,9 54,4 47,3 73,1 63,8 68,8 61,9 76,7 75,6 58,2 58,7
non-democracieS 54,1 31,0 31,0 78,0 74,2 53,9 58,8 70,5 66,1 37,3 39,8
2009
democracieS 62,9 52,7 46,8 73,1 61,6 68,6 61,4 76,5 76,7 56,2 55,4
non-democracieS 53,8 29,5 29,4 78,0 70,8 57,1 61,1 69,8 67,3 36,4 38,7
2010
democracieS 63,0 52,6 47,3 73,2 61,1 69,4 62,0 73,5 77,9 58,3 55,1
non-democracieS 53,5 29,5 29,4 78,9 70,9 57,2 61,6 66,3 68,0 34,4 38,6
2011
democracieS 63,4 52,6 47,6 74,1 58,2 69,7 63,1 76,2 78,1 59,6 54,6
non-democracieS 54,1 29,9 29,6 79,7 72,5 56,1 58,9 69,2 69,8 36,0 39,3
2012
democracieS 63,3 52,9 47,9 75,0 53,9 70,5 63,1 77,2 77,9 59,8 55,0
non-democracieS 53,8 29,2 29,3 79,6 68,5 56,0 59,0 70,2 69,5 37,3 39,2
2013
democracieS 63,4 52,7 47,5 75,3 55,9 70,3 62,5 76,7 77,6 60,8 55,0
non-democracieS 53,7 28,7 29,7 80,2 69,2 55,7 57,6 69,0 69,5 38,7 39,0
2014
democracieS 64,1 53,1 48,0 74,9 56,8 70,3 63,1 76,6 78,5 64,3 55,3
non-democracieS 54,4 27,6 28,3 80,8 71,7 56,5 59,2 70,3 69,0 41,9 38,9
2015
democracieS 64,0 52,0 49,8 75,3 56,7 69,2 62,2 77,5 78,8 63,9 54,7
non-democracieS 54,4 26,7 31,4 80,3 69,8 55,9 59,6 71,2 69,7 40,9 38,2
Among	 non-democratic	 states,	 a	 fraction	 of	 radical	 dictatorships,	where	 there	
are	no	democratic	processes	whatsoever,	can	be	distinguished.88 The comparison of 
democratic	states	with	this	group	during	2007-2015	(table	2)	shows	that	the	average	
level of the extortion by the state is even higher in the latter.89 As regards constitu-
ent grades, radical dictatorships, similarly to non-democratic states in general, are 
placed slightly higher during most of the period considered (except for 2013) in 
88 Countries	which	were	attributed	0	points	in	the	sub-category	of	Electoral	Process	in	the	Freedom in 
the World rating.
89 The data given in the Freedom in the World rating come from the 2006-2015 period (https://
www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-aggregate-and-subcategory-scores),	 for	 the	 Heritage	
Foundation ranking the data come from the previous year. Not all countries that obtained 0 points in 
the sub-category of Electoral Process in the Freedom in the World rating	were	classified	in	particular	
years in the Index of Economic Freedom. The countries taken under consideration include: Saudi 
Arabia,	China,	Equatorial	Guinea,	North	Korea,	Cuba,	Laos,	 Swaziland,	Turkmenistan,	Uzbekistan	
and Vietnam (all years), Belarus and Fiji (2008-2015), Eritrea (2009-2015), Libya and Syria (2007-
2012), Brunei (2014-2015), United Arab Emirates and Haiti (2007), Thailand (2008), Central African 
Republic (2015).
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terms	of	the	lower	government	spending,	and	during	2008-2010	in	terms	of	fiscal	
freedom.	However,	the	differences	in	their	favour	are	not	as	sharp	as	when	consid-
ering non-democratic states in general. All other constituent grades (property rights 
protection in particular) are in favour of democratic states.
Table 2. Comparison of the average grades of democracies and radical dictatorships 
according to the Index of Economic Freedom, 2007-2015
final 
Grade
property
rights
freedom 
from 
Corruption
fiScal 
freedom
government 
SpendinG
business 
freedom
labour 
freedom
monetary 
freedom
trade 
freedom
investment 
freedom
financial 
freedom
2007
democracieS 60,1 45,6 41,2 74,5 67,3 62,7 60,5 75,2 72,0 49,6 52,0
radical dictatorSHipS 46,2 22,0 27,7 74,1 67,8 41,4 49,7 66,4 60,6 26,0 26,0
2008
democracieS 63,9 54,4 47,3 73,1 63,8 68,8 61,9 76,7 75,6 58,2 58,7
radical dictatorSHipS 46,7 23,8 26,5 73,2 66,8 47,8 51,8 65,5 60,2 25,6 25,6
2009
democracieS 62,9 52,7 46,8 73,1 61,6 68,6 61,4 76,5 76,7 56,2 55,4
radical dictatorSHipS 45,7 19,4 25,1 73,3 62,9 45,3 51,7 63,9 65,3 25,6 24,4
2010
democracieS 63,0 52,6 47,3 73,2 61,1 69,4 62,0 73,5 77,9 58,3 55,1
radical dictatorSHipS 44,4 18,8 25,1 73,4 61,7 45,4 51,5 61,1 66,5 16,9 23,8
2011
democracieS 63,4 52,6 47,6 74,1 58,2 69,7 63,1 76,2 78,1 59,6 54,6
radical dictatorSHipS 45,3 19,1 25,7 73,7 64,6 44,8 51,0 64,7 67,1 17,6 24,7
2012
democracieS 63,3 52,9 47,9 75,0 53,9 70,5 63,1 77,2 77,9 59,8 55,0
radical dictatorSHipS 43,9 18,8 24,2 74,5 54,4 45,2 48,8 65,3 67,5 16,6 23,8
2013
democracieS 63,4 52,7 47,5 75,3 55,9 70,3 62,5 76,7 77,6 60,8 55,0
radical dictatorSHipS 44,1 18,1 25,7 72,7 55,4 47,8 52,5 61,0 64,7 19,2 23,8
2014
democracieS 64,1 53,1 48,0 74,9 56,8 70,3 63,1 76,6 78,5 64,3 55,3
radical dictatorSHipS 46,9 19,3 26,2 74,8 62,2 49,9 56,9 61,8 66,2 26,4 25,7
2015
democracieS 64,0 52,0 49,8 75,3 56,7 69,2 62,2 77,5 78,8 63,9 54,7
radical dictatorSHipS 45,4 18,6 29,7 70,6 60,5 43,8 52,4 62,7 65,0 25,0 25,7
North	Korea	has	been	placed	 last	 from	 the	very	first	publication	of	 the	 index,	
significantly	standing	out	among	other	states	and	its	rate	even	decreased	from	8,9	in	
1995	to	1,3	in	2015.	In	comparison,	the	final	grade	of	South	Korea,	classified	as	a	
democracy,	balanced	between	66,4	(2005)	and	73,3	(1998),	while	all	of	its	constitu-
ent	grades	were	incomparably	higher	than	those	of	North	Korea.	The	comparison	of	
these	two	states	is	particularly	important	for	two	reasons.	Firstly,	before	they	came	
into	being	as	two	separate	states,	they	used	to	be	a	one,	undivided	country	inhabited	
by	one	nation	under	one	rule.	Therefore,	the	difference	between	their	degrees	of	the	
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extortion by the state cannot be explained by cultural or historical differences, nor 
can they be based on the difference in the initial conditions. Secondly, considering 
that modern dictatorships – as argued above – are much more similar to monarchies 
than democracies, North Korea should be regarded as the essence of monarchy as 
understood	by	Hoppe,	even	more	than	eighteenth-century	monarchies	or	few	mod-
ern	official	absolute	monarchies	such	as	Saudi	Arabia	or	Brunei.	The	rulers	of	North	
Korea	not	only	take	the	office	for	a	lifetime	and	it	is	hereditary,	not	only	are	they	ab-
solute	autocrats	worshipped	in	a	way	that	eighteenth-century	monarchs	would	envy,	
but	they	also	–	as	mentioned	before	–	let	their	subjects	as	workers	on	the	internation-
al	labour	market	on	regular	basis,	which	according	to	Hoppe’s	criteria,	makes	them	
something	close	to	the	private	slave-owners.90
The annual report presented by the Frasier Institute – Economic Freedom of the 
World	–	is	yet	another	classification	that	aims	at	measuring	the	degree	of	the	eco-
nomic	 freedom	(and	what	 follows,	 the	degree	of	 the	extortion	by	 the	 state).	This	
index	takes	into	consideration	five	factors:	1)		Size	of	Government	(the	consumption	
by the state and all transfer payments related to various entitlement programs, the 
degree of the tax burden and the scale of government companies and investments), 
2) Legal System & Property Rights (independence of the jurisdiction, protection of 
property rights, impartiality of the courts, the degree of the armed intervention into 
the	rule	of	law	and	politics,	integrity	of	the	legal	system,	the	performance	bond,	reg-
ulations of the real estate trade, accountability of the police and the costs of crime), 
3)	Sound	Money	 (money	supply	growth	 rate,	 standard	deviation	of	 inflation	 rate,	
90 In 2013, the “Ten Great Principles for the establishment of a monolithic thought system of the 
KWP”	which	are	considered	 the	ultimate	 rules	 for	 the	government’s	and	society’s	co-existence	 that	
people	have	to	learn	by	heart,	were	altered.	Apart	from	changing	the	name	into	“Ten	Great	Principles	
for the establishment of a monolithic leadership system of the KWP,” the former dictator Kim Jong-il 
was	put	on	a	par	with	his	father,	Kim	Il-sung,	which	is	reflected	especially	in	the	change	of	the	phrase	
“Make absolute the authority of the Great Leader Comrade KIM Il Sung” into “Make absolute the 
authority of the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il-sung, Comrade Kim Jong-il and the Party, and defend 
it to the death.” In this statement, the Party refers to the current dictator, Kim Jong-un, the grandson 
of	Kim	Il-sung.	Another	phrase	which	was	added	to	the	document	states	that	the	Party	needs	to	be	an	
eternal	living	pulse	of	the	revolutionary	patrimony	with	the	bloodline	of	Mount	Paektu	(the bloodline 
of Mount Paektu	refers	to	Kim	Il-sung’s	family).	This	is	the	official	declaration	of	and	legitimation	for	
the	power	of	the	family	of	Kim	Il-sung	in	North	Korea.	See:	I.	Jiro,	Program for the Legitimization 
of Kim Jong-un Regime, retrieved 18 April 2016 from: http://www.asiapress.org/rimjingang/english/
report/2013-10-23/;	P.	Chang-ryong,	Kim Il-sung Portraits replaced by Kim Il-sung – Kim Jong-il Duo, 
retrieved 18 April 2016 from: http://www.asiapress.org/rimjingang/english/report/2014-10-28/;	K.	Jin	
Mi, NK Adds Kim Jong Il to ‚Ten Principles’, retrieved 18 April 2016 from: http://www.dailynk.com/
english/read.php?cataId=nk01500&num=10828;	A.	Yoo,	North Korea rewrites rules to legitimise Kim 
family succession, retrieved 18 April 2016 from: http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1296394/
democratic-peoples-monarchy-korea-north-korea-changes-ruling-principles. The previous version of 
the	text	can	be	accessed	at	the	Citizens’	Alliance	for	North	Korean	Human	Rights	website:	http://eng.
nkhumanrights.or.kr.
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inflation	 in	 the	previous	year	and	 the	 freedom	to	have	 foreign	bank	accounts),	4)	
Freedom to trade internationally (tariffs, regulations, black market exchange rates 
and limitations put upon the movement of capital and people) and 5 ) Regulation (of 
the credit market, labour market, business and the costs of bureaucracy and corrup-
tion).91	The	scale	of	the	constituent	grades	is	0-10	–	the	lower	the	grade,	the	lower	
the degree of the government extortion and the higher the degree of the economic 
freedom. The comparison of the average grades of democratic and non-democratic 
states	based	on	the	data	provided	by	the	Frasier	Institute’s	website	considering	re-
ports	from	2000-2012,	1990	and	1995	(table	3)	reflects	the	conclusion	drawn	from	
the	Heritage	Foundation	index,	even	though	the	number	of	states	considered	is	lower	
and it lacks some long-term dictatorships, including radical ones, such as: Belarus, 
Cuba, Eritrea, Equatorial Guinea, Laos, North Korea, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
–	this	is	why	there	is	no	point	in	creating	a	separate	comparison	for	radical	dictator-
ships.92
Table 3. Comparison of the average grades of democracies and non-democracies 
according to the Economic Freedom of the World in 1990, 1995 and 2000-2012.
Summary 
index
siZe of 
government
leGal 
system & 
property 
rights
Sound 
money
freedom to trade 
internationally
reGulation
1990
democracieS 6,2 5,7 6,0 6,7 6,3 6,1
non-democracieS 5,0 5,3 4,4 5,9 4,3 4,9
91 Economic Freedom of the World: 2014 Annual Report. Retrieved 16 April 2016 from: http://www.
freetheworld.com/2014/EFW2014-POST.pdf, pp. 3-6, 231-243.
92 The global report by the Frasier Institute of 2014 – perennial data: http://www.freetheworld.com/2014/
Master-Index-2014-Report-FINAL.xls;	the	ranking	for	each	year	is	presented	in	the	report	two	years	
later (e.g. the report of 2014 is based on the data from 2012), the data presented in this index concern 
the	year	 that	 that	 they	regard,	not	 the	year	of	 the	publication	of	 the	report.	The	distinction	between	
democratic and non-democratic states is based on the List of Electoral Democracies, FIW (1989-
2015):	 https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/List%20of%20Electoral%20Democracies%2C%20
FIW%201989-2015.xls – for the ranking for the particular year, I have adopted the data from the 
following	year	(that	refer	to	the	situation	during	the	year	that	the	ranking	concerns).	The	criteria	for	being	
qualified	as	a	democracy	is	obtaining	at	least	7	point	out	of	12	points	on	the	sub-category	of	Electoral	
Process and at least 20 (out of 40) points in the category of Political Rights in the Freedom in the World 
rating;	 for	details,	 see:	https://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2015/methodology. The 
countries listed above have obtained 0 points in the sub-category of Electoral Process in the Freedom 
in the World	rating	during	all,	or	majority	of,	years	that	were	considered	in	the	summary	available	at:	
https://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-aggregate-and-subcategory-scores.
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1995
democracieS 6,3 5,6 6,2 6,6 7,2 6,0
non-democracieS 5,6 6,2 5,0 6,0 5,3 5,3
2000
democracieS 6,8 5,9 6,3 7,7 7,4 6,5
non-democracieS 6,1 6,4 5,1 7,2 6,0 5,7
2001
democracieS 6,7 6,0 5,9 8,0 7,5 6,2
non-democracieS 6,0 6,4 4,8 7,2 6,1 5,7
2002
democracieS 6,8 6,1 5,7 8,2 7,5 6,7
non-democracieS 6,0 6,4 4,5 7,1 6,1 6,0
2003
democracieS 7,0 6,4 5,8 8,2 7,6 6,8
non-democracieS 6,1 6,3 4,7 7,1 6,2 6,2
2004
democracieS 6,9 6,5 5,7 8,3 7,5 6,7
non-democracieS 6,0 6,3 4,6 7,1 6,0 6,0
2005
democracieS 7,0 6,5 5,8 8,2 7,3 7,0
non-democracieS 6,2 6,6 4,9 7,0 6,2 6,4
2006
democracieS 7,0 6,6 5,9 8,3 7,4 7,0
non-democracieS 6,3 6,5 5,1 7,1 6,2 6,5
2007
democracieS 7,1 6,5 5,9 8,3 7,4 7,0
non-democracieS 6,4 6,7 5,1 7,2 6,3 6,6
2008
democracieS 7,0 6,5 5,9 8,3 7,4 7,0
non-democracieS 6,3 6,6 5,0 7,0 6,2 6,6
2009
democracieS 7,1 6,2 6,0 8,5 7,5 7,1
non-democracieS 6,3 6,6 5,0 7,1 6,3 6,7
2010
democracieS 7,1 6,3 6,0 8,6 7,5 7,1
non-democracieS 6,4 6,6 4,9 7,3 6,4 6,8
2011
democracieS 7,1 6,4 6,0 8,6 7,4 7,1
non-democracieS 6,4 6,6 4,9 7,3 6,5 6,8
2012
democracieS 7,1 6,4 5,9 8,6 7,4 7,2
non-democracieS 6,4 6,6 4,8 7,4 6,4 6,9
The average degree of the government extortion measured according to the rules 
described	above,	was	slightly	higher	in	non-democratic	states	in	all	the	years	consid-
ered.	As	regards	the	constituent	grades,	democratic	states	were	more	freedom-ori-
ented	in	all	the	years	considered	in	four	out	of	five	factors	(Legal	System	&	Property	
Rights, Sound M, Freedom to trade internationally and Regulation). Non-democratic 
states	in	1995,	2000-2002,	2005	and	2000-2007	periods	were	more	freedom-oriented	
in	terms	of	Size	of	Government.	It	is	worth	to	examine	different	components	of	these	
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results.	In	case	of	the	Size	of	Government,	non-democratic	states	were	better	(assum-
ing that government extortion is harmful) in terms of the government consumption 
compared to the overall consumption, transfers and subsidies as part of the GDP and 
(with	the	exception	of	1990)	tax	rates.	They	were	worse	in	terms	of	the	government	
companies and investments in the economy. In case of regulations, non-democratic 
states	were	better	in	all	the	years	considered	in	terms	of	hiring	and	firing	regulations,	
centralized	collective	bargaining,	minimum	wage	(except	for	2002),	administrative	
requirements for conducting business, since 2006 – bureaucracy costs and since 
2009	–	private	sector	credit.	On	average,	they	were	worse	in	terms	of	private	own-
ership	of	banks,	interest	rate	controls,	conscription,	licensing	restrictions,	how	easy	
it is to start a business, time costs related to the tax compliance and extra payments/
bribes/favouritism. As regards Sound Money, Freedom to trade internationally and 
Legal System & Property Rights, in almost all of the components of these grades, in 
all	the	years	considered,	democratic	states	proved	to	be	more	freedom-oriented	(with	
the	exception	of	 the	costs	of	crime,	 in	which	case	 the	average	grades	 in	different	
periods	varied,	but	usually	were	very	close).
The	two	reports	show	clearly	that	while	both	non-democratic,	as	well	as	demo-
cratic, states violate private property in all possible manners, non-democratic states 
exploit	citizens	in	slightly	different	ways	than	democratic	ones.	While	the	latter	ex-
tort	them	by	imposing	taxes	that	are	later	used	to	sponsor	official	entitlement	pro-
grams,	transfers	and	other	government	expenditures,	as	well	as	by	imposing	soci-
etal regulations (hiring and dismissing employees, collective bargaining, minimum 
wage)	–	which	suggests	redistribution	for	the	benefit	of	different	groups	involved	in	
democratic	fight	for	power	–	non-democratic	rulers	prefer	imposing	regulations	that	
limit possibilities of conducting business in order to limit the competition (licensing, 
tariffs, trade regulations, real estate trade market regulations, obstructions to starting 
larger	business)	and	are	less	willing	to	protect	property	rights	–	that,	together	with	
higher direct participation in the economy (government companies and banks), as 
well	 as	more	widespread	corruption,	 suggests	 redistribution	 for	 the	benefit	of	 the	
rulers themselves or privileged groups related to them. It is not surprising that this 
kind	of	extortion	is	not	necessarily	reflected	in	bigger	government	spending	since	
the income might go straight to the pockets of these people. This redistribution is 
also	implied	by	the	tendency	of	the	non-democratic	states	for	higher	inflation	–	as	
inflation	is	beneficial,	at	the	expense	of	other	market	participants,	for	the	one	who	
first	spends	the	money	that	appears	on	the	market.93
According to the criteria assumed by the authors of both reports, the average 
degree of economic freedom in modern democratic states is slightly higher – and, 
simultaneously,	the	average	degree	of	the	state	extortion	is	slightly	lower	–	than	in	
93	See:	e.g.	J.	Hülsmann,	Ethics of Money Production,	Auburn,	Ludwig	von	Mises	Institute,	2008,	pp.	
100;	104.
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non-democratic states. One might argue that these reports do not compare in measur-
able terms – terms of money – the extortion resulting from various forms of govern-
ment	intervention	into	the	private	property,	and	that	it	is	impossible	to	assess	whether	
regulations	of	trade	freedom,	licensing,	inflation,	ineffective	protection	of	property	
rights and the higher share of government companies and banks in the economy 
result in x-dollars or x-euro higher redistribution than higher taxes and regulations 
of	the	labour	market.	However,	it	is	safe	to	conclude	that	these	results	do	not	prove	
Hoppe’s thesis that democracies unequivocally violate property rights to a greater 
extent than monarchies. North Korea seems to constitute an obvious counter-exam-
ple.
As	regards	the	tendency	to	engage	in	wars,	even	though	a	number	of	researchers	
claim	that	there	is	no	clear	difference	between	democratic	and	non-democratic	states	
in	these	terms,	empirical	data	seem	to	confirm	the	thesis	that	the	more	democratic	
the	state	 is,	 the	 less	willing	 it	 is	 to	use	violence	externally.94	They	also	show	that	
modern	democratic	states	almost	never	wage	wars	against	one	another.95 During the 
period	of	1819-1991	there	were	198	wars	recorded	(with	the	death	poll	of	at	least	
1000	 people)	 between	 non-democracies	 and	 non-democracies,	 155	wars	 between	
non-democracies	and	democracies	and	no	wars	between	(stable)	democracies	and	
democracies.96	 In	 terms	of	victims	on	 the	 state’s	own	side,	non-democratic	 states	
lead,	as	well.97
It should be added that in the 20th century totalitarian and authoritarian dicta-
torships	were	by	far	most	aggressive	towards	their	own	civilians,	murdering	them	
mercilessly,	which	is	the	violation	of	the	most	basic	private	property,	self-property.	
In the ranking of 20 most deadly regimes (based on the total number of killed vic-
94 R. J. Rummel, Democracies ARE Less Warlike Than Other Regimes, in: European Journal of 
International Relations 1, 1995, retrieved 20 April 2016 from: https://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/
DP95.HTM.
95 R. J. Rummel, Libertarianism and International Violence, in: The Journal of Conflict Resolution 
27, 1983, retrieved 20 April 2016 from: https://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/DP83.HTM – empirical 
data examined in this paper reveal that during 1976-1980 period, countries characterized by “political 
freedom”	(democracies	that	respect	the	citizen	rights,	but	not	necessarily	economically	free)	were	not	
involved	 in	 any	wars	 between	one	 another.	Rummel	 also	Refers	 to	 the	works	of	 other	 researchers,	
showing	that	14	strong	democracies	during	1920-1965	period	were	not	involved	in	any	wars	against	
one	 another,	 and	 in	 the	 period	 of	 1816-1980	 only	 two	marginal	 cases	 of	wars	 between	democratic	
countries	(defined	even	more	broadly,	i.	e.	only	as	ones	where	electoral	process	and	parliament	existed)	
were	recorded:	Finland	that	together	with	Nazi	Germany	attacked	Soviet	Union,	technically	entering	
the	war	with	allied	democracies	fighting	against	Hitler	and	the	First	Italian	War	of	Independence	in	
1849.
96 Idem, Death By Government,	New	Brunswick,	Transaction	Publishers,	1994,	table	1.1.:	https://www.
hawaii.edu/powerkills/NOTE1.HTM;	https://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/DBG.TAB1.1.GIF;	see	also:	
Idem, Power Kills, Appendix 1.1, Q And A On The Fact That Democracies Do Not Make War On Each 
Other, retrieved 19 April 2016 from: https://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/PK.APPEN1.1.HTM.
97 Idem, Democracies..., op. cit.
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tims), there is only one democratic state – Great Britain.98 The list is dominated by 
communist	(8,	out	of	which	6	are	placed	in	the	first	10),	nazi	and	authoritarian	(10)	
dictatorships. Considering the number of killed civilians (annually) as percentage of 
all	citizens,	the	first	15	states	on	the	list	are	all	dictatorships.99	It	is	worth	to	note,	
however,	 that	 regardless	of	 the	 actual	power	 in	 the	hands	of	dictators,	 two	 states	
out	of	the	first	15	(Turkey	in	1909-1918	and	Romania	in	1938-1948)	were	formally	
monarchies.
The	abovementioned	examples	–	both	historic	and	modern	–	show	that	if	one	was	
to	compare	states	existing	in	the	same	periods	in	history,	one	would	conclude	that	
those more similar to democracies are not characterized by a higher degree of the ex-
tortion	by	the	state	than	those	closer	to	monarchies	–	it	is	the	other	way	round.	Simul-
taneously, Hoppe is undoubtedly right emphasizing the increase of the state extortion 
becoming more rapid since “republican-democratic era.” What could be the cause of 
this	increase	and	why	was	it	concurrent	with	the	dissemination	of	democratic	states?
6. Dissemination of democracy and the growth of the governments in modern 
times from the perspective of non-Marxian historical materialism
Attempts	to	answer	this	question	have	been	made	by	Nowak	in	his	own	theory	
–	non-Marxian	historical	materialism.	According	to	him,	both	the	government	with	
its	 institutional	structure	and	 the	system	are	only	 the	reflection	of	actual	 relations	
of	power	inside	the	class	of	the	rulers	(managers	of	the	use	of	force)	and	relation	
between	the	class	of	rulers	and	citizens	(those	who	do	not	have	the	right	to	manage	
98 Idem, Death..., op. cit., chapter 1: “20th Century Democide”: https://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/
DBG.CHAP1.HTM	 (table	1.2);	 it	 is	worth	to	notice	 that	almost	half	of	 the	victims	are	attributed	to	
the	1900-1919	period,	which	coincides	with	Hoppean	“monarchist	era”	(Idem, Statistics of Democide: 
Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900,	Charlottesville,	Center	 for	National	 Security	Law,	School	
of	Law,	University	 of	Virginia,	 1997,	 chapter	 14:	 “The	Horde	 of	Centi-Kilo	Murderers:	Estimates,	
Calculations, And Sources”: https://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/SOD.CHAP14.HTM – table 14.1E). 
In this table, Rummel additionally estimates the number of victims of colonialism (conducted by all 
countries)	as	50	million,	however,	this	number	is	not	explained	in	detailed	way	and	might	result	from	
extrapolation of the experience of the Congo Free State to all other colonies (see: https://www.hawaii.
edu/powerkills/COMM.7.1.03.HTM – Rummel estimated the number of colonialism victims as 870 
thousand).
99 Idem, Death..., op. cit., chapter 1: “20th Century Democide”: https://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/
DBG.CHAP1.HTM	 (table	 1.3);	 it	 is	 worth	 to	 note	 that	 the	 Polish	 government	 during	 the	 1945-
1948	period	is	not	considered	communist,	but	authoritarian	(which	should	be	regarded	as	a	mistake,	
considering Rummel’s explanation of the responsibility of this government for the ethnic cleansing 
conducted	 on	 the	 previously	German	 territories	 attributed	 to	 Poland	 after	 the	World	War	 II	 which	
clearly	show	that	communists	controlled	the	Polish	government	at	that	time	–		See:	Idem, Statistics Of 
Poland’s Democide: Addenda, retrieved 19 April 2016 from: https://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/SOD.
CHAP7.ADDENDA.HTM).
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the use of force).100 Particular individual members of the ruling class pursue max-
imizing	the	sphere	of	their	control	over	citizens	(authoritative	regulation)	with	the	
competition mechanism in act – if one of them devotes energy to something other 
than	dissemination	of	his	power,	he	eventually	loses	the	race.101 The natural hierar-
chy	based	on	the	spheres	of	influence	of	the	rulers	is	created,	in	which	the	institution	
whose	aim	is	to	control	their	competition	(partly,	since	there	are	also	eminence grise) 
is	 the	pyramid	of	 the	state	power	 that	 indicates	 the	functions	of	 the	highest	 ruler,	
elite	and	the	power	apparatus.102 The highest ruler (king, dictator, president, prime 
minister	etc.)	has	the	function	to	which	the	largest	sphere	of	influence	is	attributed,	
with	the	larger	“social	power,”	however	this	sphere	is	not	so	great	when	compared	
with	the	sum	of	the	spheres	of	influence	of	the	dozens	or	even	hundreds	of	thousands	
of	 apparatchiks.	Therefore,	 he	 cannot	 rule	 against	 their	will	 and	 “needs	 to	 adjust	
his	policy	to	what	has	already	been	done:	often	disregarding	or	even	contrary	to	the	
general commands.”103
The	tendency	towards	spontaneous	maximization	of	the	authoritative	regulation	
(i.e. violation of property rights of other people) by the managers of the use of force, 
mostly the hundreds of thousands of apparatchiks, is natural and constant, and the 
only factor that constitutes a barrier for it is resistance of the citizens. The strongest 
group among them is the class of the means of production managers (referred to 
by	Nowak	as	“the	owners”)	that	 	 throughout	most	of	the	history	was	sufficient	to	
control the pursuits of the rulers, preventing them from interventions, especially in 
economy	–	in	some	periods	that	group	even	managed	to	subjugate	the	rulers.	How-
ever,	when	this	class	 is	weakened	(e.g.	as	a	result	of	mass	revolts	of	 the	working	
class	–	 the	“direct	producers”	–	or	as	a	consequence	of	divisions	within	 the	class	
itself	 resulting	 from	 the	 emergence	of	 new,	 progressive	 relations	of	 production	–	
such as the distinguishing of the bourgeoisie at the end of the feudal formation), the 
authoritative regulation gets stronger.104 It decreases – temporarily or for a longer 
period of time – only in the event of the victorious “civil revolutions,” i.e. common 
disobedience	of	all	the	citizens,	both	direct	producers,	as	well	as	the	owners,	to	the	
class of rulers.105 The increase in the authoritative regulation is accompanied by the 
100 L.	 Nowak,	U podstaw teorii socjalizmu, tom I: Własność i władza. O konieczności socjalizmu, 
Poznań,	Wydawnictwo	NAKOM,	1991,	p.	158.
101 Ibidem, p. 159.
102 L.	Nowak,	U podstaw teorii socjalizmu, tom III: Dynamika władzy. O strukturze i konieczności 
zaniku socjalizmu,	Poznań, Wydawnictwo	NAKOM,	1991,	pp.	105-110.
103 Ibidem, p. 111.
104 Idem, U podstaw teorii..., tom I, op. cit., p. 212. For examples of the increase in regulation by the 
end	of	what	Nowak	understands	as	the	feudal	age,	see:	e.g.	J.	Woziński,	Monarchia absolutna Ludwika 
XIV czyli krwawy karnawał państwa, retrieved 19 April 2016 from: http://nczas.com/publicystyka/
monarchia-absolutna-ludwika-xiv-czyli-krwawy-karnawal-panstwa.
105 L.	Nowak,	U podstaw teorii..., tom III, op. cit.,	pp.	88,	92-94;	Idem, U podstaw teorii..., tom I, op. 
cit., p. 217.
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development	of	statization,	which	Nowak	understands	as	not	only	 intervention	of	
the state in the lives of the citizens, but a deeper process of substituting direct social 
relations	between	people	with	artificial	relations	of	the	citizen-state-citizen	type,	e.g.	
the	necessity	of	“sanctioning”	actions	between	citizens	by	the	state.106 In these terms, 
the	government	interference	is	constant	and	difficult	to	eliminate.
Nowak	observes	that	in	capitalism,	unlike	prior	socio-political-economic	forma-
tions	–	slavery	or	feudalism	–	the	economic	class	war	of	the	direct	producers,	includ-
ing mass revolts (“people’s revolutions”), tends to disappear as the class of means 
of	production	managers,	owing	to	the	technological	development	enabling	them	to	
produce	never	before	experienced	surplus	of	wealth,	can	“bribe”	the	direct	producers	
by	sharing	this	surplus	with	them.	This,	in	turn,	makes	them	less	willing	to	organize	
mass revolts since they have much more to lose.107	This	is	why	these	revolts,	even	if	
in the beginning they still do break out, do not require – unlike in prior formations 
mentioned	above	–	the	armed	response	from	the	state,	and	the	class	of	the	owners	is	
no	longer	forced	to	introduce	changes	in	the	relations	of	production,	which	results	in	
the	fact	that	they	are	no	longer	divided	and	weakened.	As	a	consequence,	the	phase	
of	peace	between	the	classes	of	rulers	and	citizens	is	remarkably	long-lasting	and	the	
class	of	the	managers	use	of	force	is	relatively	weak	and	can	strengthen	its	influence	
only	through	slow	evolution.108	As	Nowak	notes:	“For	a	long	time,	revolution	was	
for the state the excuse for escaping the control of the private property. Eliminating 
the	class	conflict	through	economic	means	enabled	the	bourgeoisie	to	subjugate	the	
state, permanently.”109  This	was	the	reason	for	the	dissemination	of	democracy.
Nowak	defines	democracy	as	a	system	in	which	the	civil	society	is	in	possession	
of institutional means of control over some of or all of the components of the state 
power	pyramid	(the	highest	ruler,	the	power	elite,	the	state	apparatus).110 He claims 
that democracy is an optimum system for the government during the period of peace 
between	the	classes	of	the	rulers	and	the	civilians,	when	“every	new	regulation	con-
tributes	to	growing	civilians’	resistance	–	the	more	control	the	government	pursues,	
the higher civilians’ resistance” since even though it temporarily hampers the devel-
opment of the authoritative regulations,111 it
106 Ibidem, pp. 159-160.
107	Nowak	believes	that	capitalism	is	characterized	by	constant	and	rapid	development	of	the	productive	
forces and the maximization of accumulation (see: Ibidem, p. 222).
108 See: Idem, U podstaw teorii..., op. cit., tom III,	p.	65;	Idem, U podstaw teorii..., op. cit., tom I, p. 229.
109 Ibidem, p. 352.
110 In	this	sense,	one	might	regard	as	democracy	i.	e.	“Rome’s	political	system’s	first	phase”	(I	assume,	
that	Nowak	means	here	the	phase	of	early	republic	rather	than	monarchy)	or	feudalism,	under	which	
“some	 citizens	 –	 landowners	 in	 particular	 –	were	 in	 strict	 control	 of	 the	 government	 power”,	 see:	
Ibidem, p. 350.
111 Idem, U podstaw teorii..., op. cit., tom III, p. 124.
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allows	for	[...]	elimination	of	 incompetent	public	officers	and,	using	the	threat	of	
dismissing those competent, puts he pressure on them to become even better. Any 
other	system	would	decrease	the	efficiency	of	the	government	in	the	period	of	peace	
between	classes,	making	it	more	difficult	to	make	use	of	the	only	strategy	it	could	
undertake in such conditions that serves its most important aim: manipulating the 
masses	so	that	they	do	not	see	the	slow	and	gradual,	yet	constant,	increase	in	the	
authoritative regulation.112
It	is	also	one	of	the	three	systems	(two	others	are	temporary	multi-governments	
and anarchy) that are optimal for a civil society aiming at increasing its independ-
ence	from	the	government.	This	 is	why,	 the	system	relations	during	the	period	of	
class peace are balanced under democracy.113	However,	as	long	as	this	period	was	a	
rare	occurrence	in	history	(in	fact,	only	immediately	after	entering	new	socio-eco-
nomic formations: feudalism and capitalism) and did not last long due to revolutions 
and	necessity	to	resort	 to	government	force	by	the	owners,	democracy	was	a	rare	
occurrence	as	well,	since	the	systems	adjustment	to	the	contemporary	relations	be-
tween	the	rulers	and	citizens	is	not	an	immediate	process.	Besides,	for	different	rela-
tions	of	this	kind,	non-democracies	are	optimum	for	the	rulers	(Nowak	distinguishes	
three of them: autocracy, dictatorship and despotism).114 The fact that democracy 
started	to	spread	and	become	lasting	was	the	result	of	the	described	characteristic	of	
capitalism,	which,	due	to	continuing	period	of	class	peace,	contributed	to	achieving	
the optimum system by most of the states.
However,	if	“eliminating	the	class	war	by	economic	means	enabled	the	bourgeoi-
sie	to	take	control	over	the	government,”	why	did	history	witness	the	growth	of	the	
112 Ibidem,	p.	113.	A	careful	reader	might	be	struck	by	a	paradox:	 if	 the	civil	society	 is	not	satisfied	
with	 the	 increase	 in	 the	authoritative	regulation,	 the	democratic	control	over	 the	government	power	
should	empower	them	and	result	in	dismissing	those	“most	efficient”	public	servants	–	those	who	are	
responsible for the increase in the authoritative regulation. Moreover, if the democratic control hampers 
the	increase	in	the	regulations,	what	incentive	does	the	government	have	to	maintain	it?	The	answer	is:	
it	defers	the	threat	of	widespread	dissatisfaction	and	the	necessity	of	concessions	or	an	early	revolution	
–	the	substitution	of	most	of	the	ruling	class	–	when	the	government	is	too	weak.	Hence,	the	“most	
efficient”	ones	are	not	those	who	carelessly	increase	the	authoritative	regulation	in	a	rapid	manner,	but	
those	who	do	it	sensibly	–	not	to	make	the	civil	society	dissatisfied.	Nowak	does	not	state	this	directly,	
but it can be concluded from the note made on page 124: “As regards the scheme I, the hierarchical 
government	enjoys	the	following	benefit:	democratic	institutions	to	some	extent	reduce	the	increase	in	
the	civil	alienation	allowing	for	reaching	compromises,	solutions	that	are	more	often	than	not	beneficial	
for	 the	citizens.	 […]	This	 implies	 that	 the	period	of	peace	between	the	classes	 is	being	prolonged.”	
According to the scheme I (ibidem, pp. 87-95), revolutions during the stage of the ending of the class 
peace	when	the	government	is	weak	result	in	substitution	thereof	with	revolutionary	government	or	–	at	
other stages – concessions on the government’s part.
113 Ibidem, p. 118.
114 Idem, U podstaw teorii..., op. cit., tom I,	p.	218;	Idem, U podstaw teorii..., op. cit., tom III, pp. 111-
115.
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extortion	by	 the	state	under	capitalism	coinciding	with	 the	 spread	of	democracy?	
The	weak	power	 should	not	be	 able	 to	 increase	 its	 influence.	On	 the	other	hand,	
according	to	what	has	been	already	stated	above,	the	increase	in	government	reg-
ulations should result in the citizens’ resistance and termination of the class peace 
period	–	i.e.	entering	such	class	relations	between	the	state	and	citizens	under	which	
democracy	would	no	longer	be	an	optimum.
Eventually,	the	time	came	when	the	class	of	the	owners	weakened	under	capital-
ism.	Nowak	refers	to	this	period	as	the	“economic	crash	phase”	and	believes	it	to	
be	an	inevitable	result	of	the	termination	of	the	class	war	–	under	capitalism,	direct	
producers	were	gaining	wealth	and	therefore	they	did	not	mount	any	resistance	and	
the	owners	no	 longer	 felt	 they	needed	 to	 share	 their	 income	with	 them,	which	 in	
turn resulted in decreasing demand.115	Even	 if	 this	explanation	 for	 the	worldwide	
economic	crises	in	the	first	half	of	the	20th	century	–	i.e.	the	time	when	the	state	ex-
tortion	actually	increased	–	is	wrong,	these	crises	(the	Depression	of	1920-21,	Great	
Depression	in	1929-1933	and	crises	during	the	world	wars	in	countries	whose	terri-
tory	served	as	battlefields)	were	an	actual	historic	truth.	As	a	result	of	the	weakening	
of	the	owners	class,	the	managers	of	the	use	of	force	began	to	viciously	maximize	
their	influence,	entering	the	economic	sphere	with	no	need	to	deal	with	much	resist-
ance.	Free	from	the	owners	class’s	control,	the	class	of	rulers	began	developing	the	
military	power,	increasing	its	influence	on	and	control	over	economy,	gradually	be-
coming the subject of economic life itself.116 In the meantime, due to the termination 
of	the	economic	class	struggle	under	capitalism,	there	were	no	mass	revolutions.	In	
the	broad	sense,	the	relation	between	the	rulers	and	majority	of	citizens	was	peace-
ful, and rulers strove to prolong this state by means of redistribution.117 The class 
of	former	owners	started	to	gradually	disappear,	substituted	with	the	economic	bu-
reaucracy	that	was	more	willing	to	cooperate	with	the	government.118	That	was	the	
beginning of the process of totalitarization of capitalism – merging of the rulers and 
owners	into	one	class	that	possessed	both	the	means	of	production	and	coercion.119 
For	a	while,	the	period	of	class	peace	was	endured	despite	the	growth	of	statization	
– only marginal groups in society (e.g. youth) mounted any resistance.120 Democracy 
was	still	an	optimum	system	–	since	there	was	no	threat	of	a	mass	revolution,	there	
was	no	threat	of	making	use	of	democratic	means	of	control	over	the	government	
and	there	was	no	need	to	eliminate	them	–	it	might	have	been	even	considered	inad-
visable since it could have provoke resistance.121
115 Idem, U podstaw teorii..., op. cit., tom I,	pp.	107-118;	233-234.
116 Ibidem, pp. 235-236.
117 Ibidem, p. 235.
118 Ibidem, p. 236.
119 Ibidem, p. 238.
120 Ibidem, pp. 237, 239.
121	For	when	the	elimination	of	democracy	is	beneficial	for	the	government,	see:	Ibidem,	p.	348;	idem, 
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The increase in the extortion by the state (that can be expected as a natural con-
sequence	of	 the	growing	 statization	 and	 increasing	 authoritative	 regulations	 from	
Nowak’s	perspective)	 is	not	a	 result	of	democracy,	but	 rather	a	phenomenon	 that	
coincides	with	it	due	to	specific	conditions	that	allowed	for	the	growth	of	the	govern-
ment	and	the	sphere	of	authoritative	regulation	while	the	lasting	class	peace	period	
between	the	rulers	and	the	ruled.	These	conditions	included	the	weakening	tendency	
of	the	people	to	revolt	–	people,	bribed	by	exceeding	wealth	first	by	the	owners	of	the	
means	of	production,	then	by	the	managers	of	the	use	of	force	who	seized	them	from	
the	former	and	took	their	role,	were	not	willing	to	revolt	and	therefore,	the	ruling	
class did not need to resort to more authoritative forms of government. Simultane-
ously,	the	lasting	period	of	class	peace	allowed	for	the	increase	of	statization	–	and	
eo ipso,	state	extortion	–	since	there	were	no	revolutions	that	would	make	it	possible	
to lessen the increase in the authoritative regulation.
The	increase	in	the	authoritative	regulation	and	statization	resulting	in	the	grow-
ing	extortion	by	 the	state	are	also	known	 in	contemporary	non-democratic	 states,	
since they are at the more or less similar stage of the historical process (the truth that 
they are not democratic might be a result of the fact that at some point, due to some 
peculiar conditions, they left the state of the class peace or it might be just a statis-
tical deviation – even though democracy is an optimal system under the class peace 
between	the	rulers	and	the	citizens,	it	is	not	necessary	that	each	and	every	society	
live	under	democracy.	Nowak	notes:
the	natural	sequence	of	political	systems	of	societies	[…]	does	not	need	to	be	re-
flected	in	every	case.	All	that	can	be	said	is	that	it	determines	the	direction	of	the	
tendencies	on	both	sides	of	the	social	conflict	in	all	societies	of	the	same	type	and	
that	–	assuming	idealized	conditions	–	this	tendency	will	be	getting	closer	to	realize	
this sequence in most societies. It does not refer to the natural sequence of political 
systems of societies alone, but even to the sequence of the optimum system for each 
class).122
However,	since	democracy	hampers	the	current	increase	in	the	authoritative	reg-
ulation	(which,	during	the	period	of	class	peace	is	the	cost	paid	by	the	current	ruling	
class	for	avoiding	revolutions,	i.e.	decreasing	the	probability	of	losing	power)	it	is	
not surprising that the average level of the extortion by the state in non-democratic 
states is higher – even though the average level of redistribution and social regula-
tion	is	lower,	which	is	completely	understandable	since	the	latter	are	the	cost	paid	
for the class peace – and there is no class peace in at least part of modern non-dem-
ocratic states.
U podstaw teorii..., op. cit., tom III,	pp.	114;	127.
122 Ibidem, p. 120.
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What	is	more,	if	Nowak	is	right,	one	might	assume	that	the	growth	of	statization	
eventually	 leads	 to	disturbing	 the	class	peace,	which	means	 that	democracy	 is	no	
longer	an	optimum	system	and	should	be	substituted	with	non-democratic	forms	of	
government (autocracy, dictatorship, despotism).123	Nowak	described	first	symptoms	
of	this	process	–	such	as	the	phenomenon	of	moving	the	people	in	power	from	the	
legislative	bodies	into	institutions	of	executive	power,	sometimes	the	hidden	ones	
(presumed	“advisory”	bodies	of	the	executive	power)	–	in	1986,	long	before	e.g.	the	
creation	of	the	European	Union	in	the	form	we	know	today.124
Nowak’s	thesis	also,	to	some	extent,	explains	the	case	of	North	Korea.	It	is,	sim-
ilar to the Soviet Union and other communist states, a totalitarian society in the 
understanding referred to above, and even its natural consequence – socialist society 
(one,	 in	which	one	class	controls	not	only	means	of	production	and	coercion,	but	
also means of “spiritual production” – indoctrination).125 Therefore, it is at a different 
level	of	the	historical	process,	for	which	the	optimum	system	might	be	dictatorship	
or	despotism	and	the	level	of	the	growth	of	statization	with	resulting	growth	in	the	
extortion	by	the	state	is	incomparably	higher	than	in	societies	in	which	the	classes	
of	rulers	and	owners	are	(still)	differentiated	–	this	is	reflected	in	the	results	of	the	
economic	freedom	indices.	What	is	peculiar	in	North	Korea	however,	is	the	fact	that	
while	other	communist	states	have	–	in	one	way	or	another	–	abandoned	socialism	
and totalitarianism or are still in the process of abandoning them (as foreseen by 
Nowak),	 the	state	ruled	by	Kim	Jong-un	seems	to	have	enslaved	the	citizens	per-
manently.	However,	this	might	be	a	statistical	deviation	as	well	and	might	change	
sooner or later.
7. Weak points in Hoppe’s argumentation – conclusions
The	explanation	based	on	Nowak’s	theory	is	a	possible	theoretical	explanation	of	
the	phenomenon	of	coinciding	spread	of	democracy	and	the	growth	of	the	extortion	
by the state beginning in the 20th	century,	which	proves	that	in	order	to	explain	this	
fact	coherently,	there	is	no	need	to	acknowledge	a	positive	dependency	between	the	
degree of democratic nature of the government and the degree of state extortion. 
This phenomenon is not a convincing argument for Hoppe’s thesis that democracy 
is	more	harmful	than	monarchy.	Simultaneously,	empirical	data	showing	that	while	
comparing states in the same historical periods, those more democratic ones are not 
characterized by the higher degree of the state extortion than those more similar 
to monarchies in nature make one doubt Hoppe’s theory. Although Hoppe himself 
123 Idem, U podstaw teorii..., op. cit., tom I,	p.	238;	Idem, U podstaw teorii..., op. cit., tom III, pp. 117-
118.
124 Idem, U podstaw teorii..., op. cit., tom I, p. 342.
125 Ibidem, p. 238.
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seems	to	believe	that	empirical	data	cannot	refute	“a	priori	theory”	which	describes	
the necessary facts and relations and if they do not match, they should be rejected 
as	nonsensical,	such	approach	should	be	dismissed	as	incompatible	with	logic.126 If 
a particular sentence concerning “necessary facts and relations” (or more broadly 
–	a	theory	which	is	a	coherent	set	of	such	sentences)	 is	 logically	followed	by	the	
existence of some concrete relation in reality, and if this relation does not exist in 
reality	(which	can	be	examined	empirically),	it	is	logical	that	the	particular	sentence	
is	wrong.	As	Hoppe	himself	states,	logic	questions	presumption	–	and	one	needs	to	
remember that this refers not only to presumptions on the empirical, sensory reality, 
but also to presumptions universal in nature. Obviously, empirical data can be taint-
ed by an error or misinterpreted, and should not be treated as an ultimate truth, but 
rejecting	them	in	a	situation	when	no	error	or	misinterpretation	have	been	noticed,	
just	 because	 someone	 believes	 questioning	 statements	 that	 are	 incompatible	with	
them to be “obviously absurd,” gives dominion over logic to subjective perception of 
obviousness	and	necessity.	If	one	were	to	treat	e.g.	physics	in	this	manner,	the	results	
of	Michelson-Morley	experiment	should	be	rejected	(this	experiment	showed	that,	
contrary	to	what	was	believed	at	that	time,	the	speed	of	light	in	relation	to	Earth	is	
independent	of	the	direction	of	the	planet’s	motion).	Not	always	what	seems	obvious	
and	compatible	with	reason	is	true.
Of	course,	Hoppe	acknowledges	that	“a	priori	theories”	are	not	infallible,	how-
ever, he claims that to refute them, one needs to refer to other theoretical proposition 
and not to empirical data. Although I do believe that empirical data presented in 
this	article	suffice	to	refute	Hoppe’s	theory	on	democracy	and	monarchy,	in	order	
to	convince	those	who	sympathize	with	the	belief	that	“a	priori	theories”	cannot	be	
refuted	by	means	of	empirical	data,	one	might	list	possibly	weak	points	in	his	theo-
retical analysis.
The	first	weak	point	is	that	while	comparing	an	absolute	monarch	and	a	“dem-
ocratic	ruler”,	Hoppe	 ignores	 the	fact	 that	 the	 latter	has	much	 less	power	 than	an	
absolute	monarch	–	this	is	due	to	limited,	in	comparison	with	an	absolute	monarch,	
competences. Hoppe seems to treat such a ruler, e.g. a president, as a kind of absolute 
monarch	chosen	to	reign	for	a	fixed	period	of	time.127	In	reality,	however,	in	dem-
ocratic states, competences are assigned to many different people (and in an ideal 
direct democracy – to all citizens) and in order to make a decision it is necessary to 
obtain their approval. Hence, even if Hoppe’s thesis that an average “democratic rul-
er” is just a temporary administrator and therefore is characterized by a higher time 
preference,	pursuing	only	the	increase	of	his	own	current	income,	i.e.	maximizing	
the	use	the	state’s	resources	in	a	short	time,	it	is	still	more	difficult	for	him	to	put	his	
ideas	into	practice	than	it	is	for	an	absolute	monarch.	He	needs	to	agree	with	other	
126 H.-H. Hoppe, op. cit., pp. viii-xix.
127 Ibidem, pp. 25-26.
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politicians that more often than not have different incentives. He might even be 
forced to obtain the approval of his citizens by means of referendum. It is possible 
that	due	to	this	factor,	much	of	the	wishes	of	“democratic	rulers”	are	not	realized	
and,	as	a	result,	the	overall	degree	of	the	extortion	by	the	state	is	lower	than	in	the	
case of autocracy even though all of them (or majority) pursuits increasing it.
The	second	flaw	in	Hoppe’s	argumentation	is	the	fact	that	he	does	not	acknowl-
edge	that	a	democratic	politician,	for	whom	being	in	charge	or	losing	his	office	(that	
might be related to being held responsible for his unjust actions) is determined by 
the citizens’ periodical assessment of himself or political party he represents might to 
some extent, restrain himself from violating property of those citizens and exploiting 
them	–	that	is	if	he	estimates	that	it	is	more	profitable	for	him	to	stay	in	power	for	a	
longer period of time and/or not provoke any legal actions against him, even if this 
would	lower	his	profits.	In	case	of	an	absolute	monarch,	the	fear	of	losing	position	
and	being	held	responsible	for	his	actions	is	less	significant	and	is	only	bound	to	an	
extraordinary event of a palace revolution – hence, this factor is less important in 
terms of restraining oneself from excessive extortion of citizens.
The third defect in Hoppe’s thesis is assuming the faulty presupposition that in-
creasing	the	worth	of	the	subject	of	prospective	extortion	(i.e.	private	property	under	
the	control	of	the	government)	is	equivalent	to	increasing	the	worth	of	the	monopoly	
on this extortion (i.e. government’s “capital”). While it is reasonable to assume that 
life-time	and	hereditary	monarch	is	willing	to	care	for	increasing	the	worth	of	the	
latter,	it	does	not	mean	that	he	cares	for	increasing	the	worth	of	what	he	can	exploit.	
Why?	The	worth	of	the	monopoly	on	extortion	does	not	depend	only	on	the	worth	of	
prospect	subject	of	extortion,	but	also	on	the	efficiency	of	its	extortion.	The	govern-
ment	that	is	able	to	rob	the	society	of	90%	of	the	wealth	worth	100	million	dollars	is	
worth	more	than	the	government	able	to	rob	the	society	of	10%	of	the	wealth	worth	
500 billion dollars. What is more, assumption that there might be a dependency be-
tween	increasing	wealth	and	decreasing	ability	of	the	government	to	steal	from	them	
is	reasonable,	since	richer	people	are	more	powerful	and	can	resist	more	easily.	This	
is	why	a	rational	monarch,	thinking	of	long-term	and	pursuing	the	increase	in	his	
monopoly	on	extortion	is	willing	to	stop	his	people	from	accumulating	wealth	–	or	
let	them	do	so	only	to	a	certain	extent.	For	a	democratic	politician	however,	it	is	less	
important	since	–	as	Hoppe	proves	–	he	only	cares	for	a	temporary,	short	term	profit	
and	the	worth	of	the	monopoly	on	extortion	in	the	long	term	is	not	that	significant	
from his perspective.
The	fourth	weakness	in	Hoppe’s	argumentation,	related	to	the	abovementioned	
one,	is	that	he	does	not	acknowledge	that	for	a	monarch,	who	is	in	power	potentially	
for	his	lifetime	and	whose	position	is	hereditary,	the	crucial	issue	is	to	stay	in	power.	
It	is	not	sure	if	he	does.	While	a	democratic	politician	knows	that	he	is	in	position	
only	temporarily,	a	monarch	–	who	potentially	has	a	lifetime	of	reigning	ahead	and	
who	is	going	to	pass	his	power	on	to	his	heir,	needs	to	secure	his	position	for	the	long	
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term.	This	also	implies	that	it	is	more	profitable	for	him	to	keep	his	subjects	from	
accumulating	wealth	not	 to	empower	 them.	Additionally,	a	monarch	aware	of	 the	
possibility of a palace revolution, is going to focus on the present day more dearly 
than Hoppe claims.128
The	fifth	flaw	in	Hoppe’s	thesis	is	that	he	does	not	consider	the	consequences	of	
the fact that government’s monopoly on extortion is not necessarily the only source 
of income and the only property of the monarch.129 It is true especially in case of 
monarchs that rule over more than one country. This means that it might be more 
beneficial	for	him	to	drive	one	country	into	ruin	in	order	to	invest	the	maximized	
profit	gained	in	the	short	period	of	time	in	something	more	profitable	than	the	gov-
ernance	in	that	country:	this	seems	to	be	the	case	with	king	Leopold	in	Congo,	who	
carried out predatory exploitation making use of the demand for natural rubber and 
investing	the	profit	in	other	activities	outside	his	absolute	kingdom.	This	might	also	
be	the	case	with	monarchs	who	decide	that	in	the	long	term	it	is	more	profitable	to	
invest for some time – by means of brute exploitation of their people – in expanding 
the	territory	of	their	monopoly	through	conquering	other	countries	or	confiscating	
the property of their subjects not in order to stimulate the consumption but to in-
crease	that	part	of	their	capital	which	is	used	in	production	of	e.g.	crown	property.130 
In these terms, an absolute monarch is no different from a democratic ruler – except 
for	the	fact	that	he	has	much	higher	possibilities	of	realizing	his	will.
The	sixth	weakness	in	Hoppe’s	thesis	is	–	as	observed	by	Slenzok	–	that	he	does	
not	recognize	that	the	monarch’s	vision	of	the	economic	growth	on	his	territory	de-
pends	on	his	knowledge	–	he	might	not	be	aware	that	the	predatory	exploitation	of	
the	subjects	or	exceedingly	large	number	of	regulations	decrease	the	worth	of	what	
he could exploit in the long run. He might even believe that it contributes to the in-
crease	of	its	worth.131	In	the	first	case	–	he	does	not	differ	from	a	democratic	ruler	in	
terms of adapted strategy, and in the second case – his focus of the future could lead 
even to the increase in extortion.
The	seventh	fault	in	Hoppe’s	theory	is	not	acknowledging	the	possibility	that	a	
ruler	might	consider	the	increase	in	his	power	itself	–	the	right	to	decide	on	the	lives	
(and	deaths)	of	other	people	–	more	profitable	than	accumulating	material	goods.	For	
such	a	person,	a	government	that	gives	him	even	smaller	profits	in	material	goods,	
but	allowing	him	for	excessive	control	and	subjugation	of	his	citizens	would	be	the	
most	valuable	one.	It	is	not	unreasonable	to	assume	that	people	who	seek	power	are	
128 N. Slenzok, Krytyka demokracji w filozofii społecznej Hansa-Hermanna Hoppego,	 Uniwersytet	
Śląski,	Katowice,	2012,	p.	63	(MA	thesis).
129 Hoppe notices this possibility (H.-H. Hoppe, op. cit.,p. 19), but he does not analyze its potential 
consequences.
130 N. Slenzok, op. cit., p. 63.
131 Ibidem.
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driven	by	the	pursuit	of	profit	understood	in	this	way.132 And if that is the case, the 
lower	time	preference	of	an	absolute	monarch	means	that	he	pursuits	extending	his	
monopoly on extortion not in the sense of more material goods, but in the sense of 
more possibilities of controlling the lives of other people. A democratic politician 
on	the	other	hand,	if	driven	by	such	a	desire,	is	willing	to	maximize	his	own	power	
disregarding	simultaneous	weakening	the	power	of	the	government	in	the	long	run,	
hence,	it	is	probable	that	he	is	contributing	to	weakening	its	possibilities	of	violating	
property of others and extorting them than to the increase of such. 
The	last	flaw	of	Hoppe’s	theory	is	assuming	that	the	power	of	an	absolute	mon-
arch	–	the	private	owner	of	the	government	–	is	based	on	the	general	respect	for	the	
property rights as such (contrary to democratic governments based on the respect 
for	 public	 property),	which	means	 that	 violating	 it	 by	 the	monarch	 undermines	
his position – by questioning his legitimacy in the eyes of other monarchs.133 This 
assumption	is	logically	unfounded	–	why	would	one	monarch	be	concerned	that	
another monarch violates property rights of his subjects as long as he observes 
the	 rules	 that	were	 accepted	 by	 and	 between	monarchs	 themselves?	One	might	
as	well	 assume	 that	 extorting,	or	 even	killing,	 slaves	by	one	 slaveholder	would	
undermine his position in the eyes of other slaveholders. In fact, it is quite the 
opposite:	the	right	to	extort	and	kill	slaves	is	inherent	to	the	right	to	own	a	slave	
and	other	slaveholders	cannot	undermine	this	right	without	simultaneously	under-
mining	their	own	positions.	The	same	case	is	with	absolute	monarchs	–	they	cannot	
undermine the right of one of them to extort his subjects and violate their property 
rights	without	undermining	the	absoluteness	of	their	own	power	or,	at	least,	their	
claims to it. The fact that, as noted by Hoppe, monarchs in (Western) Europe seem 
to	have	acknowledge	–	at	least	declaratively	–	the	superiority	of	rights,	including	
property	rights,	over	their	power	both	in	feudal	times	and	later	on,	results	from	the	
fact	that	in	reality	they	were	not	“completely”	absolute	monarchs,	not	only	under	
feudalism,	where	the	estates	of	the	realm,	as	well	as	the	church,	were	independent	
governing	bodies,	but	also	under	absolutism,	where	despite	the	fact	that	formally	
the	whole	power	was	in	the	hands	of	the	monarch,	he	still	needed	to	be	concerned	
132	Nowak	seems	 to	present	 such	assumption,	explaining	 it	with	 the	competition	within	 the	class	of	
coercive	measures	managers:	 “The	 position	 of	 one	 ruler	 with	 relation	 to	 another	 depends	 on	 how	
developed	his	sphere	of	control	of	the	citizens	is,	to	what	degree	actions	of	other	people	are	determined	
by	his	will.	 […]	In	 the	 long-term,	monopoly	on	 the	coercive	measures	 is	compatible	with	one	goal	
only:	maximization	of	one’s	own	power”	(L.	Nowak,	U podstaw teorii..., op. cit., tom I, p. 159). Those 
coercive	measures	managers	who	are	driven	by	 the	will	 to	achieve	other	goals	are,	 sooner	or	 later,	
eliminated.	He	believes	 that	even	when	 the	coercive	measures	managers	become	 the	owners	of	 the	
means	of	production	(as	is	the	case	with	a	totalitarian	society),	the	maximization	of	the	surplus	product	
is subordinate to the maximization of the authoritative regulation (ibidem, p. 194).
133 H.-H. Hoppe, op. cit.,	pp.	28;	85-86.
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with	the	possibility	of	resistance	by	his	subjects	was	he	to	violate	their	rights.134 
However,	e.g.	in	Russia,	mass	expropriation	of	boyars	and	passing	it	down	to	the	
Oprichniki	by	Ivan	the	Terrible	was	not	only	acceptable	by	the	existing	system,	
but it also did not undermine Ivan’s position in the eyes of other rulers – in 1573 
he	was	one	of	the	candidates	for	the	Polish	crown.
The	abovementioned	faults	show	that	Hoppe’s	theory	describes	a	model	that	not	
necessarily	reflects	the	reality	and	empirical	data	that	contradict	it	prove	that,	in	fact,	
it	 is	 incompatible	with	 reality.	The	 assumption	of	 the	 lower	 time	preference	of	 a	
hereditary	monarch	that	rules	for	life	in	comparison	with	a	“democratic	ruler”	does	
not	suffice	to	conclude	that	monarchy	contributes	to	the	violation	of	property	rights	
to	a	lower	degree	than	democracy,	nor	to	claim	that	it	contributes	to	the	process	of	
“decivilizing” more.
134 Ibidem,	pp.	19-21;	28	(footnotes).
